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ENABLING PATENTLESS INNOVATION 
CLARK D. ASAY* 
ABSTRACT 
 Do patents promote innovation?  Many in open innovation 
communities—or those that collaborate to create and make tech-
nology publicly available under permissive terms—have long ar-
gued that patents stifle rather than promote innovation.  Indeed, 
it has become nearly conventional wisdom in open innovation 
circles that the patent system imposes undue burdens on open in-
novation communities in particular.  This may be especially true 
because, for a variety of reasons, open innovation communities 
have traditionally failed to pursue patents on their technologies.  
Consequently, some argue that the best way for these communi-
ties to protect themselves is by bucking this trend and acquiring 
significant numbers of patents for defensive purposes.  Some in 
open innovation communities have begun to follow this approach. 
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 What remains underexplored in this discussion, however, is the 
extent to which patents actually threaten open innovation com-
munities.  Previous assessments treat these communities mono-
lithically in terms of patent risk, but open innovation communities 
by definition consist of a broad spectrum of participants with dis-
tinct risk profiles.  This Article disaggregates open innovation 
communities and assesses the actual risks that patents may pose 
to different categories of participants in those communities.  It 
argues that several factors diminish the actual patent risks in 
some cases, at least as they are generally presented.  However, 
the Article also highlights certain previously unexamined patent 
risks that arise based on incompatibilities between the decentral-
ized nature of open innovation and the centralized nature of pa-
tent rights.  These risks suggest that using patents to combat pa-
tent risks may not be a viable long-term strategy for open 
innovation communities.  Based on these conclusions, the Article 
then assesses other possibilities for better reconciling the patent 
system with the phenomenon of open innovation.  In particular, it 
suggests as one such possibility a two-track patent system that 
would grant open innovators an independent invention defense to 
patent infringement in exchange for an agreement not to assert 
patents except defensively.  The Article concludes by suggesting 
that such a system would not only benefit open innovation com-
munities, but may also help address broader concerns with the 
patent system as well. 
INTRODUCTION 
Do patents promote innovation and thereby satisfy their constitutional 
justification?1  Many prominent scholars conclude that the patent system 
often fails in this quest.2  Instead, some claim that patents frequently play 
the opposite role: they stymie innovation by taxing it.3  The patent wars in 
                                                          
 1.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (indicating that the purpose of granting inventors exclu-
sive rights in their discoveries is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and [the] useful Arts”). 
 2.  See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (arguing that courts should treat different technology sectors dif-
ferently in terms of patent law in order to elide significant hindrances to innovation that the cur-
rent patent system causes); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (arguing that the pa-
tent system imposes more costs than benefits in most technology sectors). 
 3.  Larry Popelka, Only Lawyers Win in Patent Wars, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 
24, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-24/patent-wars-lawyers-are-the-only-
winners (“[P]atents have simply become a tax on innovation, a necessary evil for defensive pur-
poses . . . .”); James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, What’s Wrong with the Patent System? Fuzzy 
Boundaries and the Patent Tax, FIRST MONDAY (June 4, 2007), 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1867/1750 (arguing that patents often tax 
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the world of smartphones are often cited in the popular press as evidence of 
this “patent tax” hindering innovation.4  The growing phenomenon of pa-
tent trolls—or owners of patents that do not make products or services but 
sue others that do—is yet another.5 
Many in open innovation communities—or those that collaborate to 
create and make technologies such as Linux, Android, and countless others 
available to the public under permissive terms—have long believed that pa-
tents stifle rather than promote innovation.6  Indeed, it seems to have be-
come nearly conventional wisdom in open innovation circles that patents 
impose undue hardships on open innovation communities in particular.7  
Patents may have this effect because, with limited exceptions, patent law 
                                                          
rather than spur innovation); David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android, GOOGLE OFFICIAL 
BLOG (Aug. 3, 2011), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html 
(“A smartphone might involve as many as 250,000 (largely questionable) patent claims, and our 
competitors want to impose a ‘tax’ for these dubious patents that makes Android devices more 
expensive for consumers.”). 
 4.  Glenn Chapman, Patent Wars Plague Internet Age, Add ‘Innovation Tax,’ SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/business-it/patent-wars-
plague-internet-age-add-innovation-tax-20120416-1x2ej.html; Drummond, supra note 3; Popelka, 
supra note 3 (suggesting that only the lawyers win in the patent wars and citing Oracle’s patent 
assertions against Google as one example of this tax on innovation).  
 5.  Complaints about patent trolls and the adverse effects they have on innovation are legion.  
For a brief sampling, see When Patents Attack!, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack; Charles Duhigg 
& Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-
competition.html; Ashby Jones, Patent ‘Troll’ Tactics Spread, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303292204577514782932390996. 
 6.  KARL FOGEL, PRODUCING OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE (2013), available at 
http://producingoss.com/en/patents.html#idp9475120 (describing patents as the “lightning rod 
issue” for the free and open source software movement and discussing the general anathema de-
velopers have for patents); Florian Mueller, Patents as a Threat to Free and Open Source Soft-
ware, FOSS PATENTS BLOG (Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.fosspatents.com/2010/04/patents-as-
threat-to-free-and-open.html (reviewing some of the more common reasons that free and open 
source software communities dread patents); Robert McMillan, Torvalds Comes Out Against EU 
Patent Directive, MACWORLD (Nov. 24, 2004), 
http://www.macworld.com/article/1041004/torvalds.html (quoting Linus Torvalds, founder of the 
Linux kernel, as saying that patents pose a particular burden to open innovation communities be-
cause such communities often do not have the resources with which to defend themselves against 
“spurious patent claims”); Bruce Perens, The Open-Source Patent Conundrum, SILICON TAIGA 
(Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.silicontaiga.org/home.asp?artId=3168 (including a description by a 
long-time leader of the free and open source software movement of the risks that patents pose to 
both open source developers and small application programmers).  
 7.  See supra note 6; see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature 
of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 445 (2002) (decrying strengthened intellectual property protection 
that threatens to destroy a “robust peer production sector”); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure 
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38, 48–
51 (2003) (warning that an intellectual property rights regime that is too strong will diminish the 
public domain of ideas, destroy the promise of collaborative innovation, and threaten the Ameri-
can system of science); James Ernstmeyer, Note, Does Strict Territoriality Toll the End of Soft-
ware Patents?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1267, 1276 (2009).  
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can be viewed as a strict liability regime: someone with a patent whose 
claims cover a particular technology can prevent anyone from using that 
technology, even if others independently invented the technology at roughly 
the same time.8  Consequently, open innovation communities are vulnerable 
to third-party patent claims, even absent any sort of wrongdoing or copying 
on their part. 
But for open innovation communities, the story gets worse: historical-
ly, these communities have been less likely to seek patents on their technol-
ogies than a typical proprietary enterprise.9  Open innovation communities 
are decentralized networks of participants, often without the financial re-
sources or incentives to pursue costly patents or defend against patent asser-
tions.10  Many in open innovation communities also have strong normative 
leanings against the patent system.11  Consequently, in many cases open in-
novation communities have no defensive patent portfolios with which to de-
fend themselves and no patents generally to help guarantee their freedom to 
operate. 
In response, open innovation communities have adopted a number of 
measures to address the perceived patent risks.  To some extent, each of 
these measures depends on these communities acquiring significant num-
bers of patents.  The intellectual property licenses upon which the commu-
nities rely to make their innovations publicly available often include terms 
meant to limit patent aggression from anyone that uses the licensed tech-
nology.12  Open innovation communities have also in some cases combined 
their resources to create pools of patents upon which anyone in the commu-
nity can rely.13  Other supporters of open innovation have pledged not to 
assert their patents against users of openly innovated technologies.14  Some 
                                                          
 8.  Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 475, 476–81 (2006) (laying out the current state of patent law in this regard, some pro-
posed justifications for it, and arguing in favor of a general, independent invention defense to pa-
tent infringement). 
 9.  Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent 
License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (2012) (arguing that historically open innovation communities have 
struggled to determine what role patents should play in their communities, with the answer often 
being “none at all”).  
 10.  Id. at 3. 
 11.  Id. at 3–4. 
 12.  See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, The General Public License Version 3.0: Making or Breaking 
the FOSS Movement?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 265, 286–91 (2008). 
 13.  The most prominent example of such an approach is the Open Invention Network, which 
is intended to protect the Linux ecosystem.  See OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, 
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/ (last visited May 13, 2013).  
 14.  One of the more well-known of such pledges was made by International Business Ma-
chines in 2005.  See Press Release, IBM Pledges 500 U.S. Patents to Open Source in Support of 
Innovation and Open Standards (Jan. 11, 2005), http://www-
03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/7473.wss. 
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open innovation companies have even begun to more aggressively acquire 
patents on their technologies, despite their normative misgivings about pa-
tents in general.15 
More recently, some scholars argue that such measures are not 
enough.16  They urge open innovation communities to opt back into the pa-
tent system by acquiring more patents and adopting private ordering solu-
tions meant to more thoroughly address patent risk in open innovation 
communities.17 
What remains underexplored in this discussion, however, is the extent 
to which patents actually threaten and undermine open innovation.  Asser-
tions of patent risk to open innovation communities are common,18 but deep 
analyses of the actual risks and effects are not.19  Furthermore, the standard 
explanations of why patents pose particular risks to open innovation often 
treat open innovation communities monolithically.20  But open innovation 
communities by definition typically consist of a diverse set of participants 
with significantly different risk profiles.  This Article addresses these gaps 
by disaggregating open innovation communities into the most typical cate-
gories of participants and assessing the actual patent risks that each general-
ly faces. 
As detailed later in this Article, this risk analysis suggests that the ac-
tual patent risks that participants in open innovation communities face are 
in some cases fewer and in others greater than is often suggested.  In partic-
ular, this Article identifies previously unexamined patent risks to open in-
novation communities that result from incompatibilities between the patent 
system and open innovation: that is, the decentralized, incremental, and 
cumulative nature of open innovation makes obtaining valid patents on 
openly innovated technologies more difficult than in other contexts for both 
informal and formal patent law reasons. 
                                                          
 15.  See, e.g., Red Hat Patent Portfolio Gains Independent Recognition for Its Strength, RED 
HAT BLOG (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.redhat.com/es/about/blog/red-hat-patent-portfolio-gains-
independent-recognition-for-its-strength (summarizing the company’s general discomfort with the 
current patent system while also touting its own growing defensive patent portfolio).  
 16.  See generally Schultz & Urban, supra note 9. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See supra note 6. 
 19.  For one recent attempt to do so, see Debra Brubaker Burns, Titans and Trolls Enter the 
Open-Source Arena, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 33 (2013), which provides a useful overview 
of many patent litigation suits against open innovation companies and some of the measures that 
open innovation communities might take to address these risks.  This account, however, still falls 
short of disaggregating open innovation communities and assessing the actual patent risks that the 
component parts face, which this Article argues is crucial to both understanding the actual patent 
risks and assessing potential solutions.   
 20.  For one such account, see James Boyle, Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions, and 
the Public Interest, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 30, 32–34 (2012). 
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Informally, the likelihood and desirability of these decentralized net-
works jointly pursuing and maintaining patents on what are often joint in-
ventions is low; open innovation communities would need to increasingly 
take on firm-like coordination in order to do so, but the decentralization of 
such communities is typically viewed as one of their key virtues. 
Formally, both the novelty and non-obviousness requirements under 
patent law may also pose challenges to patenting openly innovated technol-
ogies.  For instance, the incremental, cumulative nature of open innovation 
increases the likelihood that others in the community have already imple-
mented the technological concepts for which patents are sought (thereby in 
many cases defeating patent law’s novelty requirement).  And this may be 
so even in cases where the follow-on developer significantly improves the 
technology’s overall performance.  In other words, if others within an open 
innovation community have already implemented some form of the general 
concept for which patent protection is sought, in many cases it will not mat-
ter if another member of the community later significantly improves the 
concept’s implementation if that implementation implicates the same gen-
eral inventive concepts.  In such cases, that second member of the commu-
nity technically cannot obtain patent protection for their efforts since the 
second member’s efforts are not new or “novel,” as defined under patent 
law.  And the cumulative, incremental nature of open innovation may make 
such results more likely since innovation within these communities often 
consists of members incrementally iterating on the contributions of the 
overall community. 
But perhaps even more problematically, the cumulative, incremental 
nature of open innovation may mean that open innovation communities face 
heightened patenting hurdles because of patent law’s non-obviousness re-
quirement.  This requirement generally prohibits patents for innovations 
that are obvious in light of what is already available to the public.  Because 
open innovation communities make their innovations publicly available and 
often focus on incrementally and collectively iterating on those innovations, 
it may be more likely that many of those incremental contributions are ob-
vious in light of what the rest of the community has already cumulatively 
contributed to the public.  Indeed, this may be true even if the collective 
contributions of the community do cover significant inventive concepts that 
otherwise would be patentable (i.e., because, collectively, those concepts 
are non-obvious, even if the individual, incremental contributions to the 
general concept on their own are obvious). 
This Article thus argues that using patents to combat patent risks may 
not be a viable long-term solution for open innovation communities because 
many of their innovations may not be practically or legally patentable.  In-
deed, so long as the patent system retains its bias in favor of centralized in-
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novation at the firm level, open, decentralized models of innovation will 
remain at a distinct disadvantage in terms of patent protection. 
Unlike the more uncompromising positions of patent abolitionists and 
patent hawks, however, this Article argues that open innovation and the pa-
tent system are not inherently mutually exclusive.  One mode of innovation 
need not be chosen over the other.21  Instead, patent law can and should be 
reformed to better accommodate open innovation, while preserving patent 
rights where they matter most. 
This Article suggests as one possible solution a two-track patent sys-
tem that would grant open innovators and others an independent invention 
defense to patent infringement—a defense that exists today under copyright 
and trade secret law, but not under patent law—in exchange for an agree-
ment not to assert patents against others except defensively.  That is, for 
those willing to give up their right to assert patents against others, patent 
law’s liability regime would be relaxed so long as the technology in ques-
tion was independently developed, i.e., not copied. 
Others have previously proposed an independent invention defense to 
patent infringement.  But commentators have worried that such a defense 
may significantly weaken patent rights and thereby reduce incentives to in-
vent and innovate.22  This Article argues that making the defense condition-
al helps address this concern by ensuring that the defense will only apply in 
contexts where patent rights are less important, as evidenced by inventors in 
those contexts giving up the right to assert patents offensively in exchange 
for the defense.  In essence, the conditional nature of the defense would 
mean that industries would self-select depending on the actual role that pa-
tents play in any given industry. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I lays out the theoretical 
framework for assessing patent risk in open innovation communities.  It 
does so by first briefly introducing the predominant theories of patent law 
that may justify the current patent system, followed by an exploration of 
how open innovation appears to defy the logic of such theories.  In short, 
the open innovation story may suggest that, in some technological fields, 
the benefit of a patent is unnecessary; parties will and do innovate without 
the need of a patent all the time.  The Article will then lay out more fully 
the historical perception in open innovation communities that patents are 
not only unnecessary, but that they also impose undue hardships on open 
innovation that threaten to undermine it and its many benefits. 
                                                          
 21.  Accord Liza S. Vertinsky, Making Room for Cooperative Innovation, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1067 (2014) (arguing in favor of modifying patent law remedies in order to better accom-
modate cooperative innovation while also preserving sufficient patent rights).  
 22.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007) (questioning whether such a defense would too significantly weaken 
patent rights); Vermont, supra note 8 (advocating an independent invention defense to patent in-
fringement). 
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Part II then analyzes to what extent these perceptions are true.  It ar-
gues that, historically, assessments of patent risks to open innovation com-
munities are flawed because they often treat “open innovation communi-
ties” uniformly in terms of the patent risks that they face.  In reality, those 
that participate in open innovation range from the Microsofts of the world 
to individual non-commercial developers.  The patent risks for these various 
types of actors differ.  Consequently, in order to understand and address the 
risks that patents may or may not pose to open innovation, as an initial mat-
ter it is necessary to differentiate between such actors and identify the actual 
risks each faces. 
The Article argues that patent risk lies primarily where open innova-
tion projects have been significantly commercialized.  Consequently, the 
story of the small, non-commercial developer being at risk is largely a 
myth.  Non-commercial developers and open innovation foundations, which 
play an increasingly important role in open innovation communities, face 
few actual patent risks, even if in theory they do. 
Conversely, what I call “Open Innovation Companies,” as well as oth-
er commercial users of open innovation projects, face patent risks from pa-
tent trolls and commercial competitors alike.  While much of this risk is 
common to any enterprise engaged in commercial activity, some of the pa-
tent risk arises due to the decentralized, incremental, cumulative nature of 
open innovation itself.  Indeed, this Article argues that the nature of open 
innovation means that both informal factors and formal patent law make pa-
tenting in open innovation communities more difficult than in the proprie-
tary context.  This difficulty, in turn, entails patent risks to open innovation 
communities because they are at a fundamental disadvantage in protecting 
themselves in a patent system built for innovators that do not share their 
open philosophy of innovation. 
Part III then examines the various patent-centric strategies that others 
have advocated in order to address the patent risks that open innovation 
communities purportedly face.  Based on the Article’s assessment of the ac-
tual risks as well as the current conflict between the patent system and open 
models of innovation, it finds that many of these strategies are misguided.  
In particular, it argues that strategies that rely on open innovation communi-
ties acquiring significant numbers of patents are likely not viable in the long 
term so long as the patent system retains its bias in favor of centralized in-
novation at the firm level. 
Part IV briefly revisits patent law theory in light of the Article’s find-
ings.  It concludes that, while open innovation is at odds with many of the 
foundational assumptions of current patent law, the differences are arguably 
reconcilable.  It then assesses possible solutions for addressing the actual 
patent risks that open innovation communities face which, if successfully 
implemented, may help reconcile the patent system with open innovation.  
  
2015] ENABLING PATENTLESS INNOVATION 439 
It suggests as a promising solution the above-mentioned two-track patent 
system that would allow open innovators and others to partially opt out of 
the patent system altogether. 
In short, such a system would grant open innovators and others an in-
dependent invention defense to patent infringement—thus altering patent 
law’s liability regime to be more in line with copyright and trade secret 
law—in exchange for an agreement not to assert patents except defensively.  
How such a system might work, and its potential advantages and disad-
vantages, is assessed.  The Article concludes by suggesting that the pro-
posed solution holds promise not only for open innovation communities, 
but also for the broader patent system in general. 
I.  PATENT LAW THEORY 
A.  Traditional Patent Law Theory 
The most conventional theory of patent law, often referred to as the 
“utilitarian” or “economic incentives” theory, holds that a potential inventor 
will not develop an invention without the promise of a patent.23  If “free 
riders” were able to copy and redistribute the invention once available to the 
public and thereby appropriate much of its value, the initial inventor would 
not have sufficient ex ante incentives to develop the invention.24  Society, 
therefore, would lose the benefit of the invention.25  To address this per-
ceived problem, patent law grants inventors exclusive rights in their inven-
tions, thereby providing the inventor with improved opportunities to appro-
priate the value of it.26  While the grant of these rights imposes significant 
costs on society,27 it is the necessary tradeoff, the theory runs, to incent in-
ventors to create and make their inventions available to the public. 
Others have critiqued this school of thought by proposing alternative 
theories as the more appropriate justification for patent law.  For instance, 
Edward Kitch’s “prospect theory” generally argues that patent law is justi-
fied as a means to efficiently channel and coordinate post-invention re-
search and development.28  That is, granting an inventor broad monopoly 
rights early on leads to more effective development and commercialization 
later on.  As with granting mining rights, granting patent rights to inventors 
                                                          
 23.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 736–
38 (2012). 
 24.  See id. at 736 nn.158–59.  
 25.  Id. at 736. 
 26.  Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 989, 993–94 (1997).  
 27.  Lemley, supra note 23, at 736–37; see also Lemley, supra note 26; Mark A. Lemley, 
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005). 
 28.  Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1977). 
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provides them with every incentive necessary, according to this theory, to 
further develop, license, and commercialize the invention.29  Consequently, 
patent law satisfies its constitutional mandate by providing inventors the in-
centives necessary to develop their patented inventions for the benefit of 
society. 
More recently, some scholars have advocated a related theory of patent 
law based more directly in the “commercialization” of patented inven-
tions.30  These scholars generally argue that the current patent system fails 
to provide sufficient incentives for inventors to further develop and com-
mercialize their inventions, whereby society as a whole suffers and patent 
law’s constitutional mandate remains unmet.  Such scholars, therefore, pro-
pose a number of reforms to the patent system that would provide inventors 
with greater incentives to commercialize their patented inventions.  Mark 
Lemley has identified the prospect and commercialization theories as “ex 
post” theories of patent law, in contrast to the utilitarian “ex ante” theory of 
patent law.31 
Another approach, disclosure theory, argues generally that patents 
benefit society and thereby meet their constitutional mandate by encourag-
ing disclosure of inventions to the public.32  In this bargain between the in-
ventor and society, the inventor gets exclusive rights in the invention in ex-
change for disclosing the invention to the public.33  The public benefits 
from these disclosures, the theory goes, by obtaining both a new invention 
and new information that the inventor might have otherwise held secret.34 
All of these patent law theories have received significant criticism over 
the years.  More recently, Mark Lemley has critiqued each of them on the 
basis of how technologies are actually invented and disclosed.35  In a survey 
of hundreds of significant technologies, he found that most inventions are 
developed simultaneously by two or more teams working independently of 
each other.36  This phenomenon of independent, simultaneous invention 
                                                          
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See generally Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065 (2007); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property 
for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and 
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); Ted Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010).  
 31.  Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004). 
 32.  Lemley, supra note 23, at 745–46. 
 33.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 225 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring 
to a patent as a “quid pro quo” for disclosure); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 
262 (1979) (identifying the “promot[ion of] disclosure of inventions” as a key function of the pa-
tent system); see also Lemley, supra note 23, at 745. 
 34.  Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541–42 (2009). 
 35.  Lemley, supra note 23.  
 36.  Id. at 711. 
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may suggest that the utilitarian theory of patent law is dubious; if in most 
cases several teams simultaneously come up with an invention independent 
of each other, then the canonical story where the sole genius capable of de-
veloping the invention needs the lure of a patent before undertaking that ef-
fort is largely a “myth.”37  Patents may therefore be imposing unnecessary 
costs on society. 
According to Lemley, the same phenomenon casts significant doubts 
on prospect and commercialization theories as well.38  It may make little 
sense to grant strong exclusive rights to one inventor in order to facilitate 
effective post-invention research and development—the idea behind pro-
spect theory—if the inventions are likely to be happened upon by any num-
ber of independent inventors.  In other words, we might be imposing exces-
sive and ultimately unnecessary costs on society through a patent if that 
patent were unnecessary to incent the activity in the first place and instead 
primarily acts to prevent follow-on innovation. 
Indeed, Lemley’s survey finds that first inventors, armed with patent 
rights, often exercise those rights to delay product development and com-
mercialization rather than facilitate it.39  Other simultaneous, independent 
inventors are thereby prevented from pursuing follow-on inventive activi-
ties.  Commercialization and prospect theories, therefore, are found lacking 
in light of how inventive activity typically happens. 
Lastly, disclosure theory also arguably does not support patent law in 
its current incarnation.  Significant evidence suggests that many follow-on 
inventors do not read patents.40  And, even if they did, certain patent doc-
trines encourage disclosures that fail to provide valuable information, which 
may be one of the reasons that many follow-on inventors do not read pa-
tents in the first place.41  Furthermore, so many patents now issue each year 
that it is virtually impossible to read all patents that may implicate what po-
tential inventors are researching, even if they wanted to.42 
Lemley proposes as a possible substitute for these theories a “patent 
racing” theory of patent law.43  According to this theory, the current patent 
system may be justified because it encourages multiple actors to race each 
other to obtain the patent, whereby inventions are brought to the public 
                                                          
 37.  Id. at 710–12, 736–38. 
 38.  Id. at 738–45. 
 39.  See generally id. 
 40.  Id. at 745–46. 
 41.  See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 403 (2010); Benjamin N. Roin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the 
Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2023 (2005). 
 42.  The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued 277,835 patents in 2013.  U.S. Patent Sta-
tistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–2013, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last modified July 24, 2014). 
 43.  Lemley, supra note 23, at 749–60.  
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more quickly than they otherwise might be.44  Furthermore, such racing 
may mean better inventions as inventors compete to outdo each other.45  
While some have critiqued patent racing as wasteful because it encourages 
multiple actors to chase a prize that only one of them will ultimately claim, 
Lemley suggests that the benefits of racing may counterbalance any such 
waste.46 
B.  The Open Innovation Challenge to Patents 
The story of open innovation may present an even more fatal challenge 
to each of these theories: a patent system, in whatever form, may be unnec-
essary to obtain the societal benefits that these theories all argue a properly 
constituted patent system helps encourage. 
This is the argument of some in open innovation communities in its 
strongest form,47 and in many contexts, it appears to hold some credence.  
The free and open source software movement, for instance, is the flagship 
open innovation movement from which many other fledgling open innova-
tion communities draw their inspiration.  It has proven incredibly successful 
in yielding some of the most popular technologies in the world.48  And, 
much of this development activity has been pursued without seeking patent 
rights on the inventions.  Other incentives appear to motivate such inventors 
than the right to exclude others from the invention in order to commercially 
exploit it themselves.49  In fact, the very purpose of open innovation move-
ments is to make the technology as widely available as possible, with few 
restrictions. 
The licenses upon which these open innovation movements rely clear-
ly illustrate this permissive intent.  In addition to granting broad copyright 
licenses, many of the most important open licenses also include broad pa-
tent licenses.50  While many in open innovation communities do not pursue 
patents for ideological reasons, many of the most important licenses guaran-
tee that, if the developers do own patents covering the technology, they will 
not assert them against subsequent users of the technology.  Some of the li-
censes do not include explicit patent terms, although even these arguably 
                                                          
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See, e.g., Patents, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/patent (last visited May 
14, 2013) (arguing in favor of eliminating the current patent system and citing the free and open 
source software movement as an example of a movement that does not rely on patents in order to 
invent and innovate).  
 48.  An exhaustive list of such technologies is impossible, but some of the more popular ones 
include Linux, Android, Apache Webserver software, Mozilla Firefox, Chrome, among others. 
 49.  For an overview of the different types of motivations behind open innovation, see Clark 
D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 762–65 (2013).  
 50.  For an overview of typical terms, see id. at 759–62. 
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include an implied patent license given the distinctly permissive wording 
and nature of such licenses.51 
Each of the traditional patent law theories flounders to some extent 
when taking into account the paradigmatic account of open innovation.  
Utilitarian patent theory is perhaps the least justifiable.  Indeed, in open in-
novation communities, inventive activities typically occur in spite of patent 
rights, not because of them.  As discussed more fully below, patents may 
function more as a disincentive to open innovation rather than as an ex ante 
incentive. 
Prospect theory also faces a stiff challenge from the story of open in-
novation.  On first glance, open innovation movements may seem to lend 
some credence to prospect theory.  After all, if open innovation communi-
ties would simply aggressively pursue patents, patents could play a similar 
role in these movements as copyright does, i.e., by providing a basis by 
which to license and further deploy the technology, free of entanglements.  
In fact, arguably some form of this intuition might be gleaned from recent 
proposals arguing that open innovation communities should pursue patents 
more aggressively in order to better guarantee their freedom to operate.52 
But to suggest open innovation movements lend credence to prospect 
theory misapprehends both prospect theory and the nature of open innova-
tion.  The point in open innovation communities is not that patents yield 
significant benefits by allowing intellectual property owners to control sub-
sequent research and development.  Instead, the point is to grant other users 
significant freedoms so that they can further develop the technologies with-
out the control and supervision that intellectual property rights owners often 
exercise.  Patents, therefore, are unnecessary and are in fact an obstruction 
to open innovation insofar as they threaten these freedoms.  Patents may 
become helpful in some cases—for instance, to defend oneself from patent 
aggression—simply because open innovation communities exist in a world 
where their innovation model is not always the norm.  But to argue that the 
experience of open innovation supports prospect theory is circular reason-
ing at best. 
Direct commercialization theory also runs into difficulties in account-
ing for open innovation.  Google’s Android, Linux, Apache web server 
software, Mozilla’s Firefox, among many other significant commercial 
technologies, all provide strong evidence that patents are unnecessary in 
many contexts for the successful commercialization of inventions.  In fact, 
                                                          
 51.  Christian H. Nadan, Closing the Loophole: Open Source Licensing & the Implied Patent 
License, 26 THE COMPUTER & INT. LAW. 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/46088081/Closing-the-Loophole-Open-Source-Licensing-amp-the-
Implied-Patent-License-Nadan (indicating that some FOSS licenses include express patent licens-
es, while the others may contain implied patent licenses). 
 52.  See Schultz & Urban, supra note 9.  
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precisely the opposite conclusion may be more reasonable: improved com-
mercialization of technologies results in the absence of exclusive patent 
rights. 
It is true that some contributors to openly innovated technologies that 
have experienced commercial success have obtained patents reading on 
them.53  But it is hard to seriously argue that they have done so because of 
the ability to exclude.  Indeed, the point of releasing such technologies as 
open innovation is to encourage free and widespread use, without the con-
cern of being sued for patent infringement.  For this reason, as mentioned, 
many of the more significant open innovation licenses include patent li-
censes to downstream users, thereby assuaging potential patent concerns of 
those users. 
Disclosure theory fares no better in the face of open innovation.  If 
nothing else, open innovation movements show that inventors are often 
willing to disclose everything—even the “secret sauce” of source code in 
the free and open source software world—without the benefit of a patent.  
Indeed, in the open innovation world the disclosures are often significantly 
more useful than what may be found in a patent application.  A patent ap-
plication for a software program, for instance, typically will not include 
source code details54 and may, in fact, include very little useful information 
for subsequent inventors.55 
Patent racing theory and its intersection with open innovation move-
ments is perhaps the most complicated theoretical story.  The story of open 
innovation appears to synchronize well with many of the findings and rec-
ommendations of Lemley’s study.  For instance, open innovation is another 
instance of inventive activity being a “social phenomenon” rather than 
something lone geniuses pursue in isolation;56 central control of inventive 
activity is the very antithesis of open innovation movements.57  Open inno-
vation movements include significant examples of second comers effective-
ly implementing inventions in ways that eventually surpass those of the first 
mover.58  And the effective diffusion of knowledge that such movements 
encourage helps lead to significant innovation.59 
                                                          
 53.  See, e.g., supra note 15. 
 54.  Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1162 (2002) (“[A] series of recent Federal Circuit decisions has all but eliminat-
ed the enablement and best mode requirements.  In recent years, the Federal Circuit has held that 
software patentees need not disclose source or object code, flow charts, or detailed descriptions of 
the patented program.”). 
 55.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 56.  Lemley, supra note 23, at 750. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
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But at least the paradigmatic open innovation story has a hard time 
squaring with much of Lemley’s patent racing theory.  Participants in open 
innovation communities are typically either patent agnostic or patent 
averse; patents, in short, are not what motivates their inventive activity and 
in fact may threaten it.  If any sort of racing is involved, it might better be 
described as “technology racing”; users often adopt openly developed tech-
nologies because they believe in the model itself in terms of producing 
higher quality technology more quickly.60  Open innovation is thus a model 
by which users may seek development advantages over their competitors.61 
But as open innovation has increased in its commercialization, “patent 
racing” may also increasingly join the “technology racing” advantages of 
open models of innovation as important “sticks” to be obtained.  In open 
innovation communities, patents are almost always “sticks” rather than 
“carrots”; most such communities that do pursue patents have explicitly in-
dicated that their purpose in doing so is to help prevent their innovations 
from being excluded from the marketplace.62  Furthermore, a core tenet of 
recent proposals calling for open innovation communities to more diligently 
pursue patents is that such patents should only be used for defensive pur-
poses.63  And none of this is surprising given such communities’ general 
purpose of making their technologies freely available for society’s use. 
If open innovation communities do, in fact, begin to pursue patents 
more aggressively, could such a move help justify patent law based on a pa-
tent racing theory?  After all, such patenting could mean that open innova-
tion communities develop better inventions more quickly as they race to ob-
tain “sticks” with which to protect their innovative environments.  But as 
this Article will argue, even in such a case, patent racing theory breaks 
down under scrutiny.  The patent system, in such an account, becomes its 
own justification.  If the patent system is the world open innovators are 
forced to live in, then opting out may simply be a form of technological sui-
cide.  And so they pursue patents.  But to justify the patent system by high-
lighting the fact that open innovation communities prefer life over death is 
hardly a strong justification at all.  In short, current patent law and the tradi-
tional theories behind it almost certainly fall short in accounting for alterna-
                                                          
 60.  See, e.g., Katherine Noyes, 10 Reasons Open Source Is Good for Business, PCWORLD 
(Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/209891/10_reasons_open_source_is_good_for_business.html; 
David A. Wheeler, Why Open Source Software / Free Software (OSS/FS, FLOSS, or FOSS)? Look 
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 61.  See Noyes, supra note 60; Wheeler, supra note 60. 
 62.  See, e.g., Statement of Position and Our Promise on Software Patents, RED HAT (2014), 
http://www.redhat.com/legal/patent_policy.html; About OIN, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK (2014), 
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/about.php. 
 63.  Schultz & Urban, supra note 9. 
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tive theories and modes of innovation.  But, as this Article will argue, this 
need not remain so. 
C.  The Patent Challenge to Open Innovation 
According to many in open innovation communities, patents are not 
only unnecessary to trigger inventive activity, they are the avowed enemy.64  
In the free and open source software world, for instance, many free and 
open source software luminaries argue vociferously against software being 
patentable at all.65  The “computational ideas” for which patents are often 
sought and obtained are the basic building blocks of software programs;66 
they are mathematical formulas, in essence “laws of nature,” that should fall 
outside of patentable subject matter.67  Taking them out of the public do-
main through a patent grant prevents others, including specifically those in 
open innovation communities, from using these basic concepts to create ad-
ditional technology.  Consequently, future developers, users, and society in 
general suffer.68 
Other patent-related risks to open innovation communities may arise 
based on how the patent system is administered.  For instance, those in open 
innovation communities have long voiced concerns over the breadth and 
indeterminate scope of issued patents, especially in the software and infor-
                                                          
 64.  See RUSSELL C. PAVLICEK, EMBRACING INSANITY: OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT 161 (2000) (“The use of software patents has been a real problem in the Open 
Source world.”); DONALD K. ROSENBERG, OPEN SOURCE: THE UNAUTHORIZED WHITE PAPERS 
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 65.  See, e.g., RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS 
OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 21 (2d ed. 2010).   
 66.  Id. at 143; McMillan, supra note 6; Joe Mullin, “Your Criticisms Are Completely 
Wrong”: Stallman on Software Patents, 20 Years in, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 21 2012), 
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mation technology industries.69  Richard Stallman, the founder of the free 
software movement, argues that in many contexts it is impossible to deter-
mine what software any given patent covers; nor is it feasible to read all rel-
evant patents, even if they were understandable.70  Consequently, avoiding 
the patent by simply designing around it becomes nearly impossible.71  
Other options, such as licensing the patent or seeking to overturn it in court, 
also come with significant challenges such as an unwilling licensor and, in 
many cases, resource constraints on the part of the developer.72  As a result, 
for some developers opting out of inventive activity may be the only ration-
al route. 
Many in open innovation communities also take issue with how obvi-
ous and “unnovel” they perceive many issued patents to be.  For a patent to 
be issued, the Patent Statute requires that an invention be, among other re-
quirements, both “novel” and “non-obvious.”73  Novelty generally requires 
that the invention be something that others have not yet invented and pub-
licly disclosed; it must be new to the consuming public, and a patent techni-
cally may not issue if each of the claim elements in a patent application is 
found in a single prior art reference.74  The non-obvious requirement gener-
ally requires that the invention cannot be an obvious improvement on, or 
change to, the prior art based on the knowledge of someone who has ordi-
nary skill in the relevant art.75  Yet, many issued patents cover concepts 
that, according to those in open innovation communities, have either been 
in use for some time or would have been so obvious to anyone in the field 
                                                          
 69.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 
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that patenting such an idea is viewed by many in the open innovation world 
(and elsewhere) as unjust.76 
According to many commentators, open innovation communities expe-
rience the risks associated with such problems even more acutely than oth-
ers.77  Open innovation communities are often widely dispersed networks of 
contributors without the traditional incentives or resources to obtain pa-
tents.78  Consequently, individual contributors in those networks can be 
more easily stopped in their inventive tracks because they typically lack re-
sources or patents with which to protect themselves from patent aggressors 
through, for instance, a defensive patent portfolio, cross-licensing, or chal-
lenging the asserted patents’ validity in court.79  Because of the cumulative 
nature of open innovation, “royalty stacking”—where literally thousands of 
patents may read on a particular technology—and “patent holdup”—where 
each such patent holder is able to extract a higher fee than is warranted be-
cause of the threat of an injunction—also may become more likely.  Such 
issues thus further exacerbate the patent risks for many of the resource-
constrained participants in open innovation communities.80 
Consequently, despite the significant benefits of open innovation, it is, 
according to many, in constant peril.  Accordingly, many that subscribe to 
an open model of innovation have called for significant reforms to patent 
law to protect these communities from aggressive patent holders that, it is 
argued, only stymie innovative activity.  Often the call is simply one of pa-
tent abolition.81  Others have set forth serious proposals that rely on private 
ordering solutions to address the perceived patent nemesis; these private or-
dering solutions typically rely on these communities aggressively pursuing 
patents in order to better defend themselves.82  Without doing something, 
the argument goes, open innovation and its many virtues are in danger. 
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II.  ASSESSING PATENT RISKS TO OPEN INNOVATION COMMUNITIES 
So far this Article has laid out the predominant theories behind patent 
law; the open innovation challenge to those theories; and how patent law, 
according to the open innovation challenge, not only fails to incent innova-
tive activity in important technology sectors, but instead may directly 
threaten what many perceive as a better model of innovation. 
But are the alleged patent risks to open innovation communities real?  
Does the rhetoric match reality?  While allegations of patent risk to open 
innovation are common, less common are nuanced analyses of what the 
risks actually are and how such risks may affect different participants in the 
open innovation world. 
Open innovation communities, after all, are not monolithic—those that 
participate in open innovation are as varied as they are numerous.  Thus, pa-
tents do not affect all participants the same way.  Describing patent risks in 
broad strokes, without breaking down the risks that patents pose to different 
categories of participants in the open innovation world, thus runs the risk of 
misapprehending the problems as well as possible solutions.  The following 
sections describe more specifically the general categories of participants in 
open innovation communities and the patent risks that each may face. 
A.  Non-Commercial Developers 
Non-commercial developers—whether individual developers or a 
group of individuals—often play the starring role in the narrative of how 
patents threaten open innovation.83  The paradigmatic non-commercial de-
veloper has all the virtues necessary to inspire significant sympathy: cash-
strapped, yet willing to freely contribute significant amounts of innovation, 
all for the love of creativity and a strong streak of idealism.  Threatened 
with a patent suit, the resource-restrained developer is forced to shut 
down.84  And society loses. 
There are several problems with this narrative, however.  First, in-
creasingly more openly innovated technologies are developed by those paid 
to do so.85  While certainly much open innovation results absent direct eco-
nomic incentives, increasingly much of it does not, at least not anymore.  
Second, even those that contribute absent direct economic incentives often 
have significant indirect economic incentives as motivation.86  In short, the 
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independent developer who engages in open innovation purely out of ideal-
ism or altruism may be increasingly a rare species. 
But more importantly for purposes of this Article, the patent risks that 
non-commercial developers face are negligible.  Patent trolls have few if 
any incentives to come after them, since non-commercial developers may 
be both hard to find and cash-strapped.87  Patent trolls better serve their in-
terests asserting their patents against downstream commercial users of 
openly innovated technologies, since they have resources with which to pay 
a toll88 and expensive commercial products that make their likely returns 
higher.89 
Patent trolls could pursue actions against both non-commercial and 
commercial developers.  But if trolls sued non-commercial developers and a 
patent license from the troll were the result,90 the trolls might be prevented 
on the basis of that license from pursuing more lucrative actions against 
downstream commercial users of the same technologies.91 
Furthermore, typically non-commercial developers simply release 
technology in raw form, not as well-developed, documented, fully function-
ing products.  Consequently, patent trolls may face increased difficulty in 
discerning what the technology of non-commercial developers actually does 
and, accordingly, whether it is related to the claims of their patents.92 
So far, patent troll litigation bears out these intuitions.  While patent 
trolls have sued small software application developers that utilize openly 
innovated technologies in their products,93 such developers are, ultimately, 
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still commercial enterprises that have something patent trolls want.  It is 
possible that patent trolls have asserted patents against non-commercial de-
velopers and have simply settled quietly with them in a manner that forbade 
disclosure of the assertion or settlement.  But the low likelihood of patent 
assertions in the first place makes the likelihood of such confidential set-
tlements similarly low.  Furthermore, if such assertions did exist, it seems 
almost certain that the resource-constrained non-commercial developers 
would turn to the broader open innovation world for assistance, which 
would almost certainly lead to significant publicity.  But so far, such public-
ity has not occurred.  In short, non-commercial developers face little actual 
patent risks from patent trolls.  If the non-commercial developer does ulti-
mately commercialize the technology, the analysis, of course, changes.94 
Do non-commercial developers face patent risks from commercial en-
tities, whose products and services compete with the non-commercial de-
velopers’ freely available technology?  Many in the free and open source 
software world have long worried about the menacing stance of Microsoft 
with respect to Linux, whose codebase includes significant contributions 
from non-commercial developers.95  Others share anecdotal stories about 
commercial competitors wielding their patents in ways that ultimately 
forced non-commercial developers to stop developing some technology al-
together.96 
But though such patent risks are credible in theory, in reality they have 
generally not materialized.  For instance, Microsoft appears to have never 
asserted its patents against non-commercial contributors to Linux.97  In fact, 
more recently the company has gone so far as to pledge not to assert its pa-
tents against individual non-commercial developers.98  Microsoft has wield-
                                                          
 94.  For an example of a non-commercial developer facing increased patent risk once it at-
tempted to commercialize the technology, see Florian Mueller, IBM Breaks the Taboo and Betrays 
Its Promise to the FOSS Community, FOSS PATENTS BLOG (Apr. 6, 2010), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2010/04/ibm-breaks-taboo-and-betrays-its.html (discussing the case 
of TurboHercules, an open source software company facing patent assertions from IBM despite 
having existed as a non-commercial product for nearly eleven years prior to the assertions); see 
also Dana Blankenhorn, Linux Tries to Quiet the TurboHercules Mob for IBM, ZDNET (Apr. 8, 
2010), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/open-source/linux-tries-to-quiet-the-turbohercules-mob-for-
ibm/6212.  
 95.  Burns, supra note 19, at 58–61. 
 96.  See STALLMAN, supra note 65; Adam Back, PGP Timeline, CYBERSPACE, 
http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/timeline/ (last visited May 16, 2013) (reconstructing one such 
anecdote). 
 97.  Microsoft has asserted its patent portfolio against commercial users of Linux extensively.  
See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Microsoft Profits from Linux Patent FUD, ZDNET (July 25, 
2012), http://www.zdnet.com/microsoft-profits-from-linux-patent-fud-7000001598/.  But thus far 
no known evidence suggests they regularly go after non-commercial developers.  And if such as-
sertions had been made, it seems highly likely that significant publicity would result. 
 98.  See Microsoft and Novell Announce Broad Collaboration on Windows and Linux In-
teroperability and Support, MICROSOFT NEWS CTR. (Nov. 2, 2006), 
http://news.microsoft.com/2006/11/02/microsoft-and-novell-announce-broad-collaboration-on-
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ed its patents against commercial developers and users of Linux and An-
droid.99  But that is a different class of actors that faces a different patent 
risk profile, as discussed below.  Other commercial actors also appear to 
have largely abstained from asserting patents against non-commercial de-
velopers.100 
Part of the reason for commercial entities’ forbearance is likely due to 
open innovation’s maturation as a model of innovation.  Open models of 
innovation have proven sustainable and credible in yielding significant 
amounts of freely available technology, despite some early prognostications 
that success was unlikely.101  Commercial enterprises use such technology 
extensively, and in some cases they use the openly innovated technologies 
rather than expending resources to build or continue their own product 
lines.102  In other words, it typically makes little sense to assert patents 
against non-commercial developers and thereby sour relations with the wid-
er developer community; they provide free development efforts that often 
reduce the company’s own research and development expenditures. 
This factor manifests itself in other ways as well.103  For instance, in 
many cases technology companies depend on good relationships with de-
veloper communities, both in terms of hiring and in terms of developers 
creating ancillary products and services for the company’s core products 
and services.  The software application marketplaces of Apple, Google, Mi-
crosoft, and Amazon are just a few such examples.  Other technology com-
panies also often provide developers with software and hardware develop-
                                                          
windows-and-linux-interoperability-and-support/ (discussing the newfound partnership between 
Microsoft and Novell as well as Microsoft’s agreement to “not assert its patents against individual 
noncommercial open source developers”). 
 99.  Vaughan-Nichols, supra note 97. 
 100.  See Burns, supra note 19, at 56–72 for a general overview of the known patent actions 
brought against users of free and open source software, for instance.  Again, it is impossible to 
know whether this is entirely true because the threatened developers may not have publicized the 
event or may have been prevented from doing so based on settlement terms. It seems quite likely, 
however, that if such assertions of patents were anything approaching routine, those in the open 
innovation world would know about them and use them extensively in their ongoing campaign 
against patents in general.  But other than a few anecdotes, reports of such incidents are non-
existent. 
 101.  See Asay, supra note 49, at 765–68. 
 102.  See, e.g., Arik Hesseldahl, IBM Makes a Big Bet on OpenStack in the Cloud, ALL 
THINGS D (Mar. 4, 2013), http://allthingsd.com/20130304/ibm-makes-a-big-bet-on-openstack-in-
the-cloud/ (summarizing IBM’s decision to adopt OpenStack as the engine powering its Cloud 
solutions and analogizing the move to when IBM abandoned its own operating system develop-
ment efforts in favor of Linux). 
 103.  See BLACK DUCK, OPEN SOURCE GOVERNANCE IN HIGHLY REGULATED COMPANIES 5 
(2013), available at 
http://www.blackducksoftware.com/noindex/salesforce/pdfs/OSS_Governance_UL.pdf (discuss-
ing the “brand” risk firms face when failing to abide by FOSS requirements and discussing a spe-
cific example of Microsoft’s failure to adhere to FOSS license requirements and the resulting 
damage to Microsoft’s relationship with the developer community).   
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ment kits aimed at encouraging developers to create products and services 
that interoperate with the company’s platform or service.104  One sure-fire 
way to create bad rapport with developer communities is to threaten them 
with patents. 
Lastly, the possibility that license agreements with the upstream non-
commercial developers may foreclose actions against more strategic down-
stream users may also play a role in reducing the risk that non-commercial 
developers face from commercial actors.  In most cases, commercial com-
petitors are likely better served in targeting the downstream commercial us-
er or producer of the competitive technology, not the upstream, non-
commercial originator of it. 
Consequently, except perhaps in unique circumstances, patent asser-
tions from commercial competitors are unlikely, notwithstanding the fact 
that commercial enterprises may own patents covering technologies that 
open innovation communities develop.  Indeed, in the case of non-
commercial developers, strategic reasons for commercial enterprises to as-
sert patents against them may rarely, if ever, exist. 
None of this is to say that patents do not affect non-commercial devel-
opers.  The perceived risk may still be significant enough to deter some 
would-be non-commercial developers from pursuing a line of development.  
Again, some anecdotal evidence suggests that this has happened.105  But an-
ecdotal evidence also suggests that other non-commercial developers do not 
worry about patents at all.106  And such behavior falls in line with what 
some recent studies suggest in general: most developers largely ignore pa-
tents in their development efforts.107  For non-commercial developers in the 
world of open innovation, such behavior results in little actual patent risk. 
                                                          
 104.  For a few such examples, see Android Studio, ANDROID, 
http://developer.android.com/sdk/index.html (providing a link to download the software develop-
ment kit to the Android operating system) (last visited May 29, 2013); Developing Apps for iPad, 
APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/ipad/sdk/ (providing the same for developing software apps 
for the iPad) (last visited May 29, 2013); SAK Hardware Development Kit, MICROSOFT, 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/gg130920(v=winembedded.0).aspx (providing links to a 
Microsoft server hardware development kit). 
 105.  See FOGEL, supra note 6; STALLMAN, supra note 65. 
 106.  Mark Hachman, Open Source File System Takes on Microsoft’s exFAT Patents, 
READWRITE (Jan. 22, 2013), http://readwrite.com/2013/01/22/open-source-file-system-takes-on-
microsofts-exfat-patents (indicating that a developer who purportedly designed around some Mi-
crosoft technologies, when asked if his solution was free of patent risk, responded, “I don’t 
know . . . .  You should consult a lawyer.  I run this project just for fun and don’t care about pa-
tents because I’m not a U.S. resident.”). 
 107.  Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (2008) (indicating that 
available evidence suggests that most enterprises ignore patents in their development efforts). 
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B.  Foundations 
Foundations have become an increasingly important way by which 
open innovation projects are managed.108  Foundations provide diverse con-
tributors to an open innovation project a variety of benefits, including en-
suring that no one company owns or controls the contributed technology.109  
For instance, in cases where the project is run and owned by a single com-
pany, contributors to the project have less certainty about how that compa-
ny might use their contributions in the future, including the possibility that 
the company will “close” the project at some point.110  Such possibilities, in 
fact, may drive potential contributors away from the project.111 
Foundations help solve this and related issues by decentralizing power 
and decisionmaking authority.112  All contributors to a foundation-run pro-
ject either license or assign their rights in their contributions to the founda-
tion, which then manages the project on behalf of the contributors.113  A va-
riety of different types of foundations exist, from non-profit charitable 
organizations that largely rely on donations and volunteer work to non-
profit trade associations that employ some staff.114  Some of the more well-
known foundations include the Apache Software Foundation (managing 
various Apache-licensed software projects),115 the Linux Foundation (man-
aging Linux-related projects),116 the Free Software Foundation (managing 
various software projects relating to the GNU operating system),117 and the 
Open Compute Project (started by Facebook, and managing permissively 
licensed hardware specifications).118 
Based on their management, use, and distribution of openly innovated 
technologies, foundations could be subject to patent assertions from both 
patent trolls and commercial competitors.  Consequently, these increasingly 
important organizations could in theory face significant patent risks. 
                                                          
 108.  Paula Hunter & Stephen Walli, The Rise and Evolution of the Open Source Software 
Foundation, 5 INT’L FREE & OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE L. REV. 31 (2013), available at 
http://www.ifosslr.org/ifosslr/article/view/64. 
 109.  Id. at 32–34. 
 110.  Id. at 34 (reviewing as an illustration of this issue the example of MySQL, a popular open 
source database program, and its subsequent acquisition by Oracle). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 33–34. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 32–33. 
 115.  See generally THE APACHE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, http://www.apache.org/ (last visit-
ed Nov. 14, 2014).  
 116.  See generally THE LINUX FOUNDATION, http://www.linuxfoundation.org (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2014).  
 117.  See generally FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, http://www.fsf.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 
2014). 
 118.  See generally OPEN COMPUTE PROJECT, http://www.opencompute.org/ (last visited Nov. 
14, 2014). 
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Several factors limit the potential risks, however.  First, foundations 
generally do not make attractive targets for patent trolls for much the same 
reason that non-commercial developers do not: they often have very little in 
the way of resources with which to satisfy a troll’s monetary demands.119  
And, as with non-commercial developers, trolls are less likely to target 
foundations since they are neither users nor makers of expensive, complex 
commercial products that make higher returns more likely.120 
Furthermore, even in cases where foundations do possess greater re-
sources, the foundations may face reduced risk from patent trolls because 
the projects that they manage are not self-evident in terms of what they do.  
For instance, in the case of free and open source software, it may not be 
self-evident from the source code, or human-readable version of the soft-
ware, what inventive concepts the source code covers.121  And projects of-
ten are simply released as source code, with very little in the way of docu-
mentation regarding the overall inventive concepts.122  Consequently, in 
many cases patent trolls will have difficulty determining whether, in fact, 
open innovation projects may infringe upon their patent claims. 
Some foundation-managed open innovation projects that have been in-
corporated into popular commercial projects may be more self-evident in 
terms of what patents may read on such projects.  But in such scenarios, pa-
tent trolls are still more likely to go after the downstream commercial users 
of the openly innovated technology than the foundation because they will 
likely obtain higher rewards in doing so.123  Indeed, if a patent troll sued a 
foundation and the foundation obtained a patent license from the patent troll 
in resolution of the patent dispute, the license may be negotiated in such a 
way as to preclude the patent troll from pursuing more lucrative actions 
against downstream commercial users of the same technologies.124 
One could imagine some scenarios where it might be preferable for a 
patent troll to assert patents against the foundation rather than a commercial 
company.  For instance, the company, armed with more resources, may be 
more capable than a foundation in invalidating or contesting the patent in 
court.125 
                                                          
 119.  Hunter & Walli, supra note 108, at 32–33 (discussing the non-profit status of foundations 
and the manner in which they are funded as such). 
 120.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 121.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 122.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 123.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 124.  See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 125.  Some have suggested that this may be a benefit of large commercial enterprises becom-
ing more deeply involved in open innovation.  See, e.g., Robin Bloor, Patents and the Threat to 
Open Source, THE REGISTER (July 2, 2004), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/02/patents_threaten_open_source/ (positing that the most 
likely targets of patent suits based on the use of open innovation are large corporations with deep 
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Some foundations, however, notably the Linux Foundation, have con-
siderable resources and industry backing; and so such an advantage likely 
disappears against these foundations, whose strong ideological bent against 
patents may make them a formidable opponent in any patent dispute.  And 
again, the possibility of losing out on more lucrative deals with downstream 
users of the technologies also likely makes this an unattractive option in 
many cases.  Overall, foundations thus face few risks from patent trolls, 
even if technically they remain a possible target. 
Foundations also face limited patent risks from commercial competi-
tors to the projects that they host.  One reason—similar to the dynamic 
found in the non-commercial developer scenario—is that the public back-
lash against a company asserting patents against a non-profit organization 
would likely be significant.126  If a company were nonetheless intent on as-
serting patents for strategic reasons, in most cases it would be better served 
pursuing an action against the commercial competitor that uses the open in-
novation project in its products, not the foundation itself.  In some cases, in 
fact, the competitor may possess fewer resources with which to defend it-
self than a foundation.127 
The same licensing considerations discussed above with respect to pa-
tent trolls also make patent assertions from commercial competitors less 
likely.  For instance, if the foundation obtains a patent license from the 
commercial competitor in resolving its patent dispute, then all downstream 
users of the technology—including the commercial competitor’s market-
place foes—may be immune from claims of patent infringement from the 
commercial competitor based on the terms of the license and the doctrine of 
patent exhaustion. 
Again, available evidence appears to support this Section’s claims.  
While it is impossible to know whether patent trolls or commercial com-
petitors have asserted patents against foundations, to date no publicly avail-
able evidence indicates that they have.128  As such, foundations appear to 
have a similar risk profile as that of non-commercial developers: very lim-
ited. 
                                                          
pockets that are more willing to provide contractual protection to their users and, presumably, 
more able to fight the patents in court).  
 126.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 127.  As mentioned, the Linux Foundation has a significant patent portfolio with which to de-
fend itself and a broad spectrum of large, multinational companies who use Linux and therefore 
back the Foundation.  Scott M. Fulton, III, Linux Foundation: We Have Our Own Patent ‘Arse-
nal’, BETANEWS (May 25, 2007), http://betanews.com/2007/05/25/linux-foundation-we-have-our-
own-patent-arsenal/. 
 128.  Though not every conceivable database has been searched for such evidence, it seems 
likely that if such activities were anything close to routine, some evidence thereof would be avail-
able, which this author has not found.   
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C.  Open Innovation Companies 
Some view open innovation as a “non-commercial” mode of develop-
ment.129  The roots of open innovation certainly appear non-commercial in 
certain respects; after all, open innovation movements arose in part as a re-
action to firms aggressively asserting intellectual property rights in their 
products.130  Furthermore, the most widely used open innovation licenses 
make charging significant, recurring fees for use of the licensed materials 
practically impossible.131 
But the commercialization of open innovation is fait accompli.132  
Numerous firms have found ways to successfully commercialize open in-
novation, even making it the heart of a firm’s commercial activities in some 
cases.  Red Hat, a billion dollar company, is the most successful example of 
such a firm.  Many other firms use open innovation in a variety of commer-
cial contexts, but open innovation may not be their primary commercial ac-
tivity or may be only one area of commercial activity among many others.  
This section focuses on the patent risks of what I call “Open Innovation 
Companies”—that is, companies such as Red Hat whose commercial activi-
ties center on commercializing open innovation in some manner.  Patent 
risks faced by other commercial entities that use or contribute to open inno-
vation projects in some form or another will be addressed in Part II.D be-
low.133 
1.  Patent Risks in General 
Not surprisingly, Open Innovation Companies face greater patent risks 
than do non-commercial developers or foundations.  Open Innovation 
Companies have been the targets of patent trolls, for instance.134  Unlike 
non-commercial developers and foundations, Open Innovation Companies 
have commercially available products and resources with which to pay 
                                                          
 129.  Aarthi S. Anand, “Less Is More”: New Property Paradigm in the Information Age?, 11 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 65, 65 (2012) (lumping together the free and open source software move-
ment with other non-commercial instances of software development).  
 130.  Asay, supra note 49, at 797.  
 131.  Id. at 761–62. 
 132.  See Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still 
Matter? 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12–46 (2006) (discussing the increasingly successful commer-
cialization of free and open source software).  
 133.  This definition is certainly not iron-clad, and inevitably disagreements will arise regard-
ing who belongs in which category.  The purpose here is not to resolve those line-drawing ques-
tions, but instead to lay out a more nuanced (yet still necessarily somewhat general) framework 
for assessing patent risks within open innovation communities. 
 134.  Indeed, not surprisingly, Red Hat has been forced to settle claims from patent trolls.  See 
Burns, supra note 19, at 55–56.  As have others.  See Josh Taylor, Rackspace Targets Patent Troll 
to Stop the Lawsuits, ZDNET (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/rackspace-targets-patent-troll-
to-stop-the-lawsuits-7000013570/. 
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tolls, making it easier for patent trolls to (1) assess whether their patents 
may cover the commercial products and (2) obtain higher returns. 
Furthermore, Open Innovation Companies may be more likely to settle 
with a patent troll—which is often a patent troll’s goal, depending on the 
type of troll—than to fight to invalidate the asserted claims in court.135  As a 
commercial enterprise, an Open Innovation Company is often likely to be 
more utilitarian in its approach to such patent claims than, for instance, 
some foundations motivated by strong normative concerns in defending 
open innovation.136 
Patent troll risks to Open Innovation Companies may be particularly 
acute given the technology sectors in which such companies are involved.  
For instance, patent troll activity has been found to be significant in the in-
formation technology and software sectors.137  And, the most successful 
open innovation to date has occurred in the software world. 
One potentially mitigating factor is that, again, trolls may be better 
served pursuing actions against downstream users of the technologies rather 
than the upstream provider thereof.  If a patent troll sues an Open Innova-
tion Company and the parties resolve the dispute with the Open Innovation 
Company taking a license that protects its downstream users, then the pa-
tent troll may have been better served suing the numerous downstream us-
ers, not the upstream Open Innovation Company.  In fact, Red Hat has ne-
gotiated such licenses with at least some patent trolls.138 
                                                          
 135.  See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, Red Hat CEO Hates Patent Trolls, but Says Sometimes You Just 
Have to Pay Up, NETWORKWORLD (May 5, 2011), 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/050511-red-hat-ceo-patents.html (summarizing settle-
ments that Red Hat has agreed to with patent trolls, with Red Hat’s CEO indicating that settling is 
often more financially responsible than fighting the asserted patent in court); see also Lemley & 
Melamed, supra note 88, at 2121–29 (distinguishing between different types of patent trolls and 
the types of outcomes they prefer).  
 136.  See Brodkin, supra note 135. But see Mike Masnick, Why Red Hat Is Wrong That It’s 
Better to Just Pay Patent Trolls Sometimes, TECHDIRT (May 6, 2011), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110505/15041914171/why-red-hat-is-wrong-that-its-better-to-
just-pay-patent-trolls-sometimes.shtml (criticizing Red Hat’s utilitarian approach to settling with 
patent trolls).  For an example of an Open Innovation Company taking a different approach, see 
Taylor, supra note 134. 
 137.  See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-trolls.html (noting that “patented technol-
ogies like software are the building blocks of modern commerce”); see also Lemley, supra note 
69; Colleen V. Chien & Aashish R. Karkhanis, Functional Claiming and Software Patents (Santa 
Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 06-13, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2215867; Adi Kamdar & Daniel Nazer, Deep 
Dive: Software Patents and the Rise of Patent Trolls, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 28, 2013), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/deep-dive-software-patents-and-rise-patent-trolls (high-
lighting many of the specific issues that software patents in the hands of patent trolls pose to those 
in the software/high tech industries). 
 138.  Jon Brodkin, How Red Hat Killed Its Core Product—And Became a Billion-Dollar Busi-
ness, ARSTECHNICA (Feb. 28, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/02/how-red-hat-killed-
its-core-productand-became-a-billion-dollar-business/ (interview with Red Hat CEO Jim White-
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Open Innovation Companies also face patent risks from more tradi-
tional commercial competitors.  Microsoft’s patent threats against Linux 
and, more recently, Android, are the most heavily cited case-in-point of 
commercial competitors wielding patents against users of open innova-
tion.139  But other commercial enterprises have also brought patent suits 
against Open Innovation Companies on the basis of their use of openly in-
novated technologies.140 
In this context, it is noteworthy that, despite this evidence, commercial 
competitors have initiated very few formal lawsuits against Open Innova-
tion Companies.  Commercial competitors may frequently assert patents 
against Open Innovation Companies pre-litigation, resulting in settlements, 
licenses, or some other resolution unknown to the general public.  However, 
if pre-litigation patent assertions and resolutions were routine, it seems that 
at least some of these would mature into formal litigation, even if the cases 
were ultimately settled.  This is not to say that commercial competitors do 
not pose patent risks to Open Innovation Companies.  But it is to say that, at 
this point, it is difficult to ascertain the precise nature of this risk due to the 
paucity of information about such assertions that is publicly available. 
Some of this apparent lack of patent assertions may result from the 
same public relations factor discussed in the context of non-commercial de-
velopers and foundations.  While Open Innovation Companies that compete 
with another enterprise’s products and services are more likely to be sued 
than either non-commercial developers or foundations, they may still enjoy 
increased leeway due to the feel-good nature of open innovation.  A com-
mercial competitor almost certainly would not allow such a factor to pre-
vent it from asserting its patents against a direct threat to its commercial 
success.  But, at least on the margins, Open Innovation Companies may en-
joy a free pass as a result of these public relations factors that they other-
wise would not. 
2.  To Patent or Not to Patent 
One way Open Innovation Companies could reduce the risks that they 
face from patent trolls and commercial competitors is to patent the technol-
ogies that they invent.  Naturally, the technologies may still be subject to 
patents that cover some aspect of the overall technology or overlapping pa-
                                                          
hurst indicating that the company often settles with trolls in a manner that protects the company’s 
downstream users). 
 139.  Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Microsoft’s Most Profitable Mobile Operating System: An-
droid, ZDNET (May 8, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/microsofts-most-profitable-mobile-
operating-system-android-7000015094/. 
 140.  See, e.g., Stephen Shankland, Sun Settles Kodak’s Java Suit for $92 Million, CNET (Oct. 
7, 2004), http://news.cnet.com/Sun-settles-Kodaks-Java-suit-for-92-million/2100-1012_3-
5401804.html (summarizing the settlement of Kodak’s patent claims against Sun for its use of 
Java software, a popular openly innovated technology). 
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tents—the so-called problem of “patent thickets.”141  But if Open Innova-
tion Companies patented whatever technologies that they did invent, they 
would at least remove some possible pieces of the thicket from being as-
serted against them.  And, in the case of commercial competitors, they may 
be able to use such patents to negotiate patent peace. 
But historically, Open Innovation Companies have not aggressively 
pursued patents.142  Others have chronicled the perceived reasons for this 
behavior: open innovation communities often have strong ideological lean-
ings against patents in general; open innovation communities are made up 
of large networks of contributors that do not have the resources or incen-
tives to pursue patents; and because patents can eventually become a sword 
rather than a shield, open innovation communities do not trust patents and 
thus forego pursuing them.143 
While these reasons may apply in some contexts, they do not apply 
across the board.  In the case of Open Innovation Companies, resource con-
straints are less of an issue.  In fact, Red Hat has begun to build a signifi-
cant patent portfolio, despite being ideologically opposed to patents.144  
Furthermore, for startup Open Innovation Companies, investors may look 
favorably upon patent acquisition, thus providing at least some incentive for 
these companies to pursue patents.145 
Most other Open Innovation Companies do not appear to be following 
Red Hat’s lead, however.146  Such Open Innovation Companies may not 
pursue patents for many of the same reasons that some claim open innova-
tion communities in general have historically failed to pursue patents, in-
cluding a cultural disdain for patents.  Indeed, if “openness” is a company’s 
selling point, then patents in many ways seem inimical to that approach. 
3.  Inherent Patent Gaps and Risks 
But even if Open Innovation Companies chose to more diligently pur-
sue patents, this Article argues that significant limitations exist in any ag-
gressive patent acquisition strategy.  Such limitations, in turn, may help ex-
plain the lack of patenting by many Open Innovation Companies as well as 
                                                          
 141.  See generally Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, 
and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL’Y AND THE ECON. 119, 121 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.pdf (laying out the problem of pa-
tent thickets and the threat that they pose to innovation generally). 
 142.  Schultz & Urban, supra note 9. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  See supra note 15. 
 145.  Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results 
of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1296–1309 (2009). 
 146.  For instance, in a survey of fifty other Open Innovation Companies, only five owned any 
patents, according to the USPTO’s database.  None of these five, furthermore, owned significant 
numbers of patents, with the high being seventeen (results on file with the author).  
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highlight certain patent risks that appear to be inherent to Open Innovation 
Companies and open innovation communities in general under current pa-
tent law. 
First, Open Innovation Companies do not invent many parts of the 
openly innovated technology that they use.  In many cases, in fact, the point 
of adopting open innovation is to avoid development work.  So, even if 
Open Innovation Companies seek patents on the pieces that they contribute, 
large swaths of the technology upon which they rely may be, technically, 
unpatentable by them. 
If others in the community choose to patent their contributions to a 
project upon which an Open Innovation Company relies, then the patent 
risks that the Open Innovation Company faces may decrease some.  The li-
censes under which the technologies are made available generally help 
promote patent peace between users of the technology.147  And if a contrib-
utor patents its contribution, it may be less likely that a commercial compet-
itor or patent troll obtains a patent on the same technology.  Furthermore, 
some open innovation communities have created patent pools upon which 
participants in a given community can rely to fend off would-be patent ag-
gressors.148 
But even in cases where other contributors do patent their contribu-
tions, Open Innovation Companies that use such patented technologies still 
face patent risk.  In typical commercial licensing, for instance, a technology 
licensor provides the licensee with protection in the form of an indemnity, a 
warranty, or both, against third-party intellectual property claims.149  In the 
open innovation universe, this is generally not true.150  In fact, the licenses 
under which openly innovated technologies are made available generally 
disclaim any such protection.151  In the world of patents, such disclaimers 
are even more significant since independent invention is no defense to a pa-
tent infringement claim.152  And, the possibility of overlapping patents and 
patent thickets makes patent risks even more acute.  Thus, though the deci-
sion of an open innovation project contributor to patent its contribution may 
help indirectly by reducing the likelihood that someone else will patent the 
same technology, it is certainly no guarantee against patent risks. 
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If others choose not to patent their contributions, then the patent risks 
for Open Innovation Companies increase.  The contributor may have al-
ready explored patenting its technology and opted against doing so due to 
the presence of existing patents.  Accordingly, the owners of such patents 
may eventually assert them against the Open Innovation Company.  Or, 
even absent an already existing patent, the failure to patent may make it 
more likely that a commercial competitor or a patent troll obtains patents 
that read on the technology. 
4.  Patenting the Unpatentable 
So is the answer simply for Open Innovation Companies and others in 
open innovation communities to overcome their bias against patents and 
more diligently pursue them?  Recent proposals have argued along these 
lines.153  As discussed, significant patent risks would remain even if this 
strategy were pursued.  But more importantly, this Article argues that the 
nature of open innovation may make patenting the resulting technologies 
inherently more difficult than in the intra-firm context.  Consequently, any 
strategy that relies primarily on patenting open innovation seems inherently 
unstable under current patent law. 
For instance, one of the primary advantages of open innovation is its 
decentralized, incremental nature.154  While open innovation communities 
often have hierarchies, the general development model allows diverse con-
tributors to collectively and efficiently create technology.155  As such, in 
many cases it may be difficult to determine who the inventor of any given 
inventive concept actually is.  And patents require inventors to be speci-
fied.156 
To illustrate: if Open Innovation Companies only contribute one piece 
to a larger inventive concept that the community is collaboratively creating, 
whose invention is it?  And who is in a position to patent it?  The collabora-
tive, incremental nature of open innovation may mean that only the entire 
community is rightly considered the inventor of many broader inventive 
concepts.  In some cases, especially in projects where one contributor is the 
primary contributor to the project, this may not be an issue.  But in more 
collaborative projects, where each contributor is adding some incremental 
piece to a larger inventive concept, it almost certainly is. 
Could open innovation communities solve this puzzle by collectively 
pursuing patents on open innovation projects?  “Joint inventorship” is a 
well-established doctrine in patent law that allows multiple inventors to file 
                                                          
 153.  Schultz & Urban, supra note 9. 
 154.  Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 
52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1245–47 (2003); Mann, supra note 132, at 21–22. 
 155.  Benkler, supra note 154. 
 156.  37 C.F.R § 1.41 (2013). 
  
2015] ENABLING PATENTLESS INNOVATION 463 
for and obtain patents.157  By some accounts, joint inventorship may also be 
the norm in patenting.158 
Realistically, though, joint inventorship is not a solution for open in-
novation communities.  First, because of the collaborative, incremental na-
ture of open innovation, in many cases it would be difficult to determine 
who from any given community qualifies as a joint inventor.  Only those 
that contribute significant material to the inventive concept embodied in the 
patent’s claims are considered joint inventors; those that merely implement 
the invention or that contribute only “prior art” material are not.159 
But perhaps more fundamentally, the type of coordination and consen-
sus necessary for open innovation communities to jointly pursue, maintain, 
and enforce patents seems even less likely.  For instance, enforcing jointly 
owned patents in a court of law requires the unanimous consent of all joint 
owners.160  Each joint owner also has the right to assign its equal, undivided 
right in the patent to anyone else it wishes, regardless of any objections that 
other joint inventors may raise.161  Effectively resolving these and similar 
issues would require open innovation communities to increasingly take on 
the attributes of a traditional firm.  But one of the points of open innovation 
is to transcend the limitations that firms impose.162  Open innovation com-
munities may excel at collaborating to create technology, but this model of 
decentralized collaboration is precisely what would make collectively pur-
suing, maintaining, and enforcing joint patents difficult if not impossible in 
many cases. 
Open Innovation Companies could simply ignore these possible inven-
torship issues and pursue patents on broader inventive concepts that the 
community collectively creates.  And some almost certainly have.  But sig-
nificant informal and formal hurdles mar the way in so doing.  Informally, 
an Open Innovation Company that began to aggressively obtain patents on 
inventions that the community collaboratively developed would almost cer-
tainly face some backlash.163  Pursuit of such patents defies the very es-
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sence of open innovation by seeking exclusive rights in what the entire 
community helped create or is working to create.  Such backlash may be 
especially true in cases where the Open Innovation Company pursuing the 
patents was not the primary contributor to or originator of an inventive con-
cept. 
Even in cases where Open Innovation Companies promise to only use 
such patents in order to protect open innovation (that is, as a shield), con-
cerns remain.  The very purpose of patents is to centralize rights, whereas 
open innovation’s is to decentralize them.  So even when such centralized 
power is employed on behalf of openness and decentralization, the intrinsic 
contradiction between the two means that openness is always in danger of 
collapsing on itself.164  As the old adage goes, promises are made to be bro-
ken.165  And even where purportedly binding mechanisms are adopted to 
guard against these undesirable outcomes, the effect and durability of such 
mechanisms is only as good as the predictability of judicial interpretations 
and enforcement of the same. 
Formally, patent law may present additional hurdles to patenting open-
ly innovated technologies.  If an Open Innovation Company seeks patents 
on inventive concepts relating to an open innovation project, the contribu-
tions of others in the community could bar such patents due to issues with 
“obviousness” and lack of “novelty.”  Under patent law’s novelty require-
ment, for instance, an invention must be new, that is, not already present in 
the prior art.166  If an Open Innovation Company were to seek a patent on 
inventive concepts that the community had already implemented, and these 
implementations include all elements of the patent application’s claims, the 
Open Innovation Company’s patent application should fail due to lack of 
novelty.167  And this would be true even if the company significantly im-
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proved the concepts’ implementation, so long as the same general concepts 
were implicated. The incremental, collaborative nature of open innovation 
may make such results more likely since innovation within open innovation 
communities often consists of members incrementally and frequently iterat-
ing on the collective contributions of the community. 
Perhaps even more problematic, an Open Innovation Company’s pa-
tents may be more likely to fail than in other contexts due to issues with ob-
viousness.  For instance, patent law requires that, for a patent to be issued 
on an inventive concept, the inventive concept cannot have been obvious to 
someone ordinarily skilled in the relevant art and familiar with what has al-
ready been done in the community and elsewhere at the time of inven-
tion.168  But the incremental, cumulative nature of open innovation means 
that overcoming the non-obviousness hurdle is likely more difficult for 
open innovation communities because participants’ contributions are often 
only incremental changes to a larger body of collaboratively created tech-
nology that is publicly available.  In short, the often incremental contribu-
tions of participants are more likely to be obvious in light of what the rest of 
the community has already done or is doing.  And this may be so even if the 
collective contributions of the community do cover significant inventive 
concepts that otherwise would be patentable (i.e., because, collectively, 
those concepts are non-obvious, even if the individual, incremental contri-
butions to the general concepts on their own are unpatentable because they 
are obvious). 
Of course, if Open Innovation Companies did pursue patents on the 
community’s collaborative inventions, they may actually succeed in obtain-
ing them in many cases, even if the inventions are technically obvious or 
lacking in novelty.  Indeed, others have chronicled the shortcomings of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) in assessing wheth-
er patents should be granted.169 
Nonetheless, the obstacles that patent law’s novelty and non-
obviousness requirements present to open innovators may still surface later 
on.  For instance, others wishing to invalidate such patents—such as a 
commercial competitor involved in a patent dispute with the Open Innova-
tion Company or even someone within the open innovation community it-
self—would have a readily available record of prior art (i.e., the contribu-
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tions of others in the open innovation community) to which they could 
point the USPTO and courts.  And that readily available record of prior art 
would consist in many cases of incremental, cumulative contributions of the 
community that make the open innovator’s patent “non-novel” and/or obvi-
ous in light of what the community had already accomplished.  These issues 
could become particularly problematic if long-standing calls for tightening 
the obviousness and novelty requirements are heeded.170 
Indeed, in the free and open source software context, others have sug-
gested that the availability of the source code makes these communities 
more susceptible to patent infringement claims because the ability to in-
spect the source code makes it easier to prove patent infringement.171  By 
the same token, the availability of the source code and other technologies 
may also make patents on openly innovated technologies easier to eventual-
ly invalidate, even if such patents do initially issue. 
Such issues are easily resolved in traditional firms.  Firms file for and 
obtain patents that cover the collective contributions from all of their em-
ployees and contractors.  Or, in joint inventorship scenarios, collaborating 
firms work out via contract who owns what.  Modern patent law thus ac-
commodates this mode of production relatively well.172 
But where inventive activity transcends firms and embraces a larger 
community, modern patent law fails to be as accommodating.  The decen-
tralization found in open models of innovation is both a blessing and a 
curse, at least insofar as modern patent law is concerned.  Decentralization 
may provide certain advantages over a more centralized mode of produc-
tion.  But it simultaneously makes patenting its technologies inherently 
more difficult and, in some cases, impossible. 
5.  Open Innovation’s Counterbalancing Act 
Despite these risks, the benefits of open innovation may help counter-
act some of them.  For instance, an Open Innovation Company may enjoy a 
significant head start in adopting openly innovated technologies as the basis 
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of its commercial activities; it can forego much initial development work 
that would otherwise be necessary before launching its products and ser-
vices. 
Furthermore, the Open Innovation Company will likely be able to ob-
tain “free” labor from those that adopt its products and services and im-
prove upon them.  This ongoing community support may lead to more rapid 
innovation, which in turn may ultimately lead to greater commercial suc-
cess. 
Lastly, Open Innovation Companies may benefit from the general 
goodwill of the broader open innovation universe.  The positive association 
that many have with open innovation may indirectly and directly benefit 
such firms, which in turn may make some of the costs associated with pa-
tent assertions more bearable. 
6.  Conclusion 
In sum, Open Innovation Companies face significantly greater patent 
risks than do non-commercial developers and foundations.  Patent trolls are 
more likely to target Open Innovation Companies than non-commercial de-
velopers or foundations because (1) Open Innovation Companies have 
money and (2) Open Innovation Companies often produce commercial 
products, which means that (a) patent trolls may have an easier time detect-
ing infringement and (b) patent assertions are likelier to result in more lu-
crative outcomes.  Open Innovation Companies also face patent risks from 
commercial competitors, though to date such suits seem less than routine. 
Open Innovation Companies could theoretically build a large patent 
portfolio with which to defend themselves and better guarantee their free-
dom to operate.  And some Open Innovation Companies such as Red Hat 
have begun to do precisely that.  Others, however, do not appear to have 
taken this approach, at least not yet. 
Importantly, some of this inaction and the resulting patent risks almost 
certainly result due to the nature of open innovation itself.  First, because 
Open Innovation Companies do not invent much of the technology that they 
use, they are not in a position to patent much of it.  Second, if others in the 
community fail to patent such technologies as well, then the patent risk in-
creases for Open Innovation Companies using such technologies.  Third, 
large swaths of such technology may be unpatentable by anyone for both 
practical and legal reasons.  Within firms, collaborative development makes 
patenting easier; in open innovation communities, in many cases it may 
make patenting more difficult if not impossible.  Consequently, the nature 
of open innovation enhances the patent risks that Open Innovation Compa-
nies face, at least based on current patent law. 
Nonetheless, the benefits of open innovation may counterbalance some 
of these risks.  This does not mean that the system should not be improved.  
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But it does mean that the patent problems for open innovation—even in its 
commercialized form—may not be as dire as some suggest. 
D.  Commercial Users of Open Innovation 
The final category of participants in open innovation communities 
consists of commercial enterprises that use or contribute to open innovation 
in some form or another, but whose commercial activity is not primarily fo-
cused on open innovation.  Such commercial users of open innovation 
range from the Googles and Apples of the world to any number of small 
software application developers that include openly innovated technologies 
in their applications. 
1.  Patent Risks in General 
The patent risks that commercial users of open innovation face are 
similar in many respects to those of Open Innovation Companies.  Patent 
trolls have asserted patents against commercial users of openly innovated 
technologies.173  Larger firms may be more likely targets of patent trolls be-
cause of their significant resources174 and because they often sell expensive, 
complex products that increase the likelihood of obtaining higher returns.175  
Nonetheless, smaller commercial enterprises are increasingly becoming pa-
tent troll targets, too.176 
Commercial competitors also pose significant patent risks to commer-
cial users of open innovation.  Oracle’s patent assertions against Google for 
its use of Java in Android are one recent high-profile example in this con-
text.177  Patent assertions from commercial competitors may be more man-
ageable for larger users of open innovation when they have significant pa-
tent portfolios themselves,178 though the opportunity costs that they incur in 
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defending themselves may still be significant.179  For smaller firms, the lack 
of a significant defensive patent portfolio may prove a distinct disadvantage 
in defending themselves in the marketplace.180 
Furthermore, because openly innovated technologies generally come 
with no patent protection from the contributors to open innovation projects, 
users are typically left on their own.  This has increasingly become an issue 
for users of Android and Linux; Microsoft is purported to have reached 
numerous patent licensing deals with such users,181 and some Android users 
are reported to be switching platforms altogether.182  If contributors to the 
open innovation project have not patented the technologies, the risks that 
commercial users of openly innovated technologies face may increase be-
cause it may be more likely that others have patented the same technolo-
gies.  And as we have seen, the likelihood of contributors to open innova-
tion projects successfully patenting their contributions may be lower due to 
the decentralized, incremental nature of open innovation. 
2.  Open Innovation’s Counterbalancing Act 
While both large and small commercial players face patent risks as a 
result of their use of openly innovated technologies, certain factors may 
help offset some of these risks.  First, while companies may end up paying 
licensing fees to both patent trolls and commercial competitors, the overall 
cost structure of using openly innovated technologies may still be worth it.  
Because a company saves so much initially by adopting the freely available 
technologies, fees that become due later may still pale in comparison to the 
costs of either licensing the technologies commercially or developing the 
technologies themselves.183 
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Furthermore, even if the patent costs of using open innovation are 
equivalent to, or eventually greater than, what it would have cost to either 
commercially license or develop the technology, the greater flexibility that 
openly innovated technologies present may also offset some of these 
costs.184  Users may also benefit from the broader community and its con-
tributions to the technology.  Conversely, a “closed” solution often comes 
with a restrictive license agreement, less of a community willing and able to 
accelerate the technology’s development, and less flexibility. 
Of course, such benefits may not always outweigh the patent risks.  
Problems with patent thickets and royalty stacking may be particularly 
problematic in technology areas where open innovation is the most perva-
sive, such as the software world.185  Indeed, these problems seem increas-
ingly evident in the case of Android, an open source software platform used 
on many smartphones and tablets, and the ongoing smartphone patent wars 
between the likes of Apple, Samsung, Motorola Mobility, Microsoft, Nokia, 
numerous patent trolls, and many others.186 
Nonetheless, to date no mass exodus from Android has occurred, de-
spite its perceived patent problems, though some significant users may be 
leaving soon.187  The seeming “staying power” of Android and other openly 
innovated technologies may result from several factors, including the bene-
fits of openly innovated technologies described above and the likelihood 
that similar patent issues would occur regardless of whether an open or 
closed technology were adopted. 
Last, the “public relations” factor that diminishes patent risks for non-
commercial developers, foundations, and Open Innovation Companies also 
may play a role in reducing patent risks for commercial users of open inno-
vation.  Doubtless, the public relations factor probably has the least effect 
for this category of open innovation users, primarily because strategic rea-
sons for asserting patents against a commercial competitor that happens to 
use open innovation may be easy to come by.  Nonetheless, the public rela-
tions factor still may play a role on the margins.  Oracle and Microsoft, for 
instance, have received significant amounts of negative press for their pa-
tent activities with respect to open innovation and its use by commercial 
competitors.188 
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3.  Conclusion 
In sum, the patent risks that commercial users of open innovation face 
are similar to the patent risks that Open Innovation Companies face.  Patent 
troll risk exists but is more the product of the patent system in general than 
open innovation in particular.  Similarly, commercial users of open innova-
tion may become targets of their commercial competitors based on their use 
of open innovation, but such competition is likely regardless of what solu-
tion—whether open or closed—they adopt. 
However, open innovation may enhance these risks.  First, because 
openly innovated technologies are often made available without any sort of 
patent protection, users of open innovation are typically left on their own.  
And if such users lack a robust patent portfolio, they may be at the mercy of 
their commercial competitors. 
Furthermore, because open innovation is not heavily patented, due at 
least in part to the decentralized, incremental nature of open innovation it-
self, it may be more likely in some cases that both patent trolls and com-
mercial competitors obtain patents reading on the technologies that they 
use.  Consequently, patent risks may be greater for commercial users of 
open innovation not only because they receive no patent protection from 
their licensors, but also because such licensors’ failure or inability to patent 
openly innovated technologies makes it more likely that others have or will. 
But the advantages of open innovation may help offset some of the 
disadvantages associated with these risks.  Indeed, openly innovated tech-
nologies are often free for the taking.  That may mean that users do not get 
the advantages of patent protection, but it also means that users save signif-
icantly as they avoid having to pay heavy upfront fees to commercially li-
cense the technology from a third party or develop it themselves.  Further-
more, even in cases where the deferred costs are equivalent to or greater 
than a commercial solution, the flexibility inherent with an open innovation 
solution may still make the openly innovated solution worth it. 
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In some cases, the patent costs that users of open innovation face may 
deter them from continuing to use the openly innovated solution.  But even 
in those cases, other factors may be at play.  In the Android scenario, for in-
stance, many have complained that Android is not as “open” as claimed,189 
which may be the actual reason that some such as Samsung are reported to 
be considering switching platforms.  As open innovation projects become 
more centralized with one organization, the advantages of the decentralized 
model may begin to diminish.  And when that occurs, the patent costs may 
tip the balance away from nominally open projects. 
This suggests something important about open innovation and pro-
posed solutions to the patent risks that it may face.  The more centralized 
that open innovation projects become, the more likely that open innova-
tion’s advantages, which largely result from decentralization, will disap-
pear.  And the very essence of patents is centralization.  While it is certainly 
true that private ordering solutions to open innovation’s patent risks can re-
allocate the starting point of a patent by widely distributing its benefits to 
others, a patent remains at its heart a set of rights possessed by its owner.  
The only permanent way to distribute its benefits to the public, therefore, 
may be to eliminate the exclusive rights altogether. 
III.  ADDRESSING PATENT RISKS WITH PATENTS 
So far this Article has explored, at both a theoretical and practical lev-
el, a central tenet of open innovation communities: patents threaten open 
innovation.  As discussed, certain factors reduce the patent risks to many 
that participate in open innovation communities.  For non-commercial de-
velopers and foundations, for instance, the patent risks seem negligible. 
For Open Innovation Companies and commercial users of open inno-
vation, however, the patent risks increase.  Some of these risks arise due to 
the nature of open innovation itself.  The patent system does not accommo-
date a decentralized mode of production well because the very premise of 
patent law is that centralization of rights is needed in order to promote in-
novation.  Conversely, one of the driving forces behind open innovation is 
that decentralization is a virtue, not a vice. 
Some proposed solutions to these patent risks focus on private order-
ing mechanisms meant to counteract them.  Many of the proposals seek to 
turn the exclusivity of patents on its head in order to defend and promote 
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open innovation.  Such proposals, therefore, rely on the acquisition of sig-
nificant numbers of patents and using them to help enforce openness. 
This Article argues that such solutions are inherently unstable.  Patents 
threaten open innovation, not because they are simply in the wrong hands, 
but because the patent system assumes that centralization of rights is a vir-
tue, not a vice.  Open innovation and its successes defy this basic proposi-
tion in many contexts.  And in so doing, patent rights, however deployed, 
present a basic contradiction to the realities (and virtues) of open innova-
tion. 
The next sections examine the most standard patent-centric strategies 
that open innovation communities use to counteract perceived patent 
threats.  Part III concludes that, while many of these strategies have some-
thing to offer, they cannot avoid the fundamental conflict between the cen-
tralizing approach of patents and the decentralizing nature of open innova-
tion.  Consequently, the most effective means by which to promote both 
models of innovation is to reform patent law itself to better accommodate 
open innovation.  Part IV takes up the task of initially exploring how this 
might be done. 
A.  Patent Peace Provisions 
One way open innovation communities seek to limit patent risk is 
through “patent peace” provisions commonly found in open innovation li-
censes.  Such provisions stipulate that users of the openly innovated tech-
nologies may not assert their patents against any of the upstream licensors 
and, often, any other users of the same technology; if they do, their license 
to use the technology ceases.190  Such licenses also often require that any-
one contributing to, and/or distributing the openly innovated technology, 
explicitly grant all other users thereof a license to exercise any of their pa-
tents that read on the technology.191 
Some of the limitations to this approach are quickly apparent.  First, 
only those using the technology are subject to the patent peace terms.  Pa-
tent trolls and many commercial competitors will, therefore, avoid the ef-
fects of such terms and remain free to pursue patent suits against users of 
openly innovated technologies.  Consequently, users of the technology, 
while safe from other users of the technology, have no such guarantee from 
non-users of the technology or even former users who find it in their inter-
est to give up their licenses in favor of asserting patents against a competi-
tor. 
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Indeed, commercial competitors are often quite fastidious in their use 
of openly innovated technologies in order to ensure that such patent provi-
sions do not jeopardize their patent portfolios.192  It is thus unclear that pa-
tent peace provisions have much of an effect other than ensuring that large 
corporations spend significant amounts of time avoiding the reach of such 
terms.193  Those that could benefit from them the most—Open Innovation 
Companies and commercial users of open innovation—in fact likely receive 
little in the way of patent risk mitigation through these types of terms. 
The patent peace provisions may be even less effective than imagined 
since open innovation communities do not generally patent their inventions, 
and in fact, as argued, in some cases simply cannot.  The patent peace pro-
visions may thus often be effectively empty promises, since those making 
the promises neither possess any rights to license nor the ability or inclina-
tion in many cases to obtain such rights.  This in turn may mean it is more 
likely that a commercial competitor or patent troll has or will.  Overall, 
then, while patent peace provisions may provide some comfort, the extent 
to which they actually guard against patent risks appears limited. 
B.  Patent Pledges 
Open innovation communities have also been the beneficiaries of “pa-
tent pledges” from supporters of open innovation.  For instance, Red Hat 
has made an extensive pledge that it will only enforce its patents, if at all, 
defensively.194  IBM has also pledged that it would not assert over 500 of its 
patents against open innovation communities.195  Others have made similar 
pledges.196 
The most immediate drawback with this approach is that it relies on 
unlikely goodwill.  Despite such pledges, for instance, significant numbers 
of patents remain a risk to open innovation communities, especially to Open 
Innovation Companies and commercial users of open innovation.  Even 
from those electing to make such pledges, the pledges may only include 
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“junk” patents,197 an accusation commonly leveled against IBM198 and, 
more recently, Google.199 
It is also unclear to what extent such pledges are enforceable.  IBM, 
for instance, has allegedly broken its pledge in some cases.200  But it is far 
from certain what legal theory would require IBM or any other pledger to 
remain strictly true to their pledges.201 
Furthermore, while pledges may be perceived as gestures of goodwill 
towards smaller, purportedly more vulnerable participants in open innova-
tion communities, as we have seen, these participants face little patent risk 
in any event.  One might argue that pledges are one of the significant causes 
of this limited risk.  But it seems more likely that such pledges are made 
precisely because the pledgers never intended to assert patents against non-
commercial developers, foundations, and the like.202 
For Open Innovation Companies and commercial users of open inno-
vation, patent pledges may, on the margins, address some patent risk.  But 
patent pledges have almost uniformly come from other significant partici-
pants in the open innovation world.  Thus, the likelihood of patent suits 
from these pledgers on the basis of open innovation use was already low 
due to the informal strategic bond between the pledgers, Open Innovation 
Companies, and other commercial users of open innovation. 
In some cases such strategic alignment may not exist.  For instance, 
IBM, with its diverse set of business interests, almost certainly does not 
align with Google, a significant participant in open innovation, in all of its 
strategic interests.  But that simply points to another of a patent pledge’s 
weaknesses—IBM and others carefully select which patents to pledge so as 
not to compromise parts of their patent portfolios which they may wish to 
eventually wield against Google or some other competitor. 
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Patent pledges also do little in the way of patent troll risk.  That risk is 
nearly unavoidable, regardless of the patent strategy, so long as the patent 
system retains its bias in favor of the centralization of rights. 
Lastly, patent pledges also do nothing in terms of addressing the inher-
ent difficulties and resulting risks that exist in patenting openly innovated 
technologies.  Those, too, result from the theoretical underpinnings of the 
current patent system—namely, its bias in favor of granting exclusive rights 
to a centralized point and, generally, a strict liability standard for infringe-
ment of those rights. 
C.  Patent Pools 
Another strategy used to protect against patent risk is to create what 
are commonly referred to as “patent pools.”  The most prominent example 
of a pooling effort is the Open Invention Network.203  In such an arrange-
ment, an entity is formed whose purpose is to acquire patents and use them 
to defend open innovation, typically a specific open innovation project.  
Any third party can obtain a royalty-free patent license from the pooling en-
tity so long as the third party is willing to enter an agreement with the pool-
ing entity not to assert its patents against the open innovation project and 
any of its uses.204 
In the case of Linux, the Open Invention Network appears to have en-
joyed some success.  Prominent technology companies such as Red Hat, 
Google, and IBM have joined the Open Invention Network as both mem-
bers and licensees.  In some cases, the Open Invention Network has as-
signed some of its patents to particular licensees and members in order to 
help them defend their use of Linux against patent aggressors.205  Further-
more, such patent pools almost certainly affect the calculus of commercial 
competitors and whether they are willing to assert their patents against users 
of Linux and thereby face possible counterclaims. 
But patent pooling efforts can only do so much about patent troll risk. 
They may play a role in reducing the risk that patent trolls obtain patents on 
the same or similar inventions, but the pooled patents cannot be used in any 
sort of defensive way against patent trolls. Furthermore, some have worried 
that patent pools could themselves create patent risks if the pool’s patents 
were to eventually fall into the wrong hands.206  Indeed, the centralizing ef-
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fects of patent law ensure that patent trolls and other risks remain no matter 
what private ordering mechanisms are adopted. 
Furthermore, patent pooling efforts seem unnecessary to protect the 
development efforts of non-commercial developers and foundations, since 
these parties face little in the way of actual patent risk.  Instead, it seems 
that open innovation patent pools are largely a mechanism by which com-
mercial enterprises agree to both avoid patent aggression among themselves 
and obtain patent support in the event that someone outside the network 
brings patent suits against one of them. 
However, those companies whose membership in such patent pools 
would most benefit the pools are the ones most likely to forego joining.  
Generally patent pools are a collection of players whose strategic interests 
align in such a way that asserting patents against each other on the basis of 
open innovation use was already unlikely.  Consequently, while pooling ef-
forts can lend patent support to companies within the network against those 
without, they are less likely to be the catalyst for achieving patent peace 
among participants, since those alliances already existed informally and 
were likely to continue. 
Lastly, patent pooling efforts cannot solve the inherent difficulties in 
patenting openly innovated technologies.  Even in cases where patent pools 
do acquire patents reading on openly innovated technologies, the decentral-
ized, incremental, freely accessible nature of open innovation may mean 
that others wishing to invalidate such patents will have an easier time doing 
so, as discussed above. 
In sum, though patent pools have proved to be a useful mechanism by 
which to address some of the effects that a centralizing patent system has on 
open innovation and its decentralized mode of production, they seem less 
capable of solving the inherent conflict.  That conflict and the risks that 
flow from it will continue so long as the patent system remains based pri-
marily on the assumption that centralized rights, whatever their costs, are an 
overall boon to innovation. 
D.  The Defensive Patent License 
More recently, Jason Schultz and Jennifer Urban have proposed the 
“Defensive Patent License” (“DPL”) as a more comprehensive means by 
which to address the patent risks that open innovation communities face.207  
As an initial matter, Schultz and Urban argue that open innovation commu-
nities must abandon their traditional aversion to patents and arm them-
selves; otherwise the escalating patent wars may very well engulf open in-
novation in their wake.208  They then review the perceived reasons for why 
                                                          
 207.  Id. at 37. 
 208.  Id. at 5. 
  
478 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:431 
open innovation communities do not patent their technologies and the vari-
ous patent strategies that have been employed to counteract patent threats, 
noting along the way the shortcomings of each.209 
Schultz and Urban then lay out the basics of the DPL: each party that 
joins the DPL commits to irrevocably license its entire patent portfolio roy-
alty-free to anyone else that joins the DPL community.210  In return, such 
party similarly receives an irrevocable, royalty-free license to each DPL 
member’s patent portfolio.211  Each party also commits to ensure that as-
signees of its patents abide by the DPL’s terms.212  If a party wishes at any 
time to leave the DPL community, it may.  But it must give six months’ no-
tice, at which point it can exit the DPL community.213  However, the licens-
es that it granted prior to its exit remain irrevocable and royalty-free, and 
other members of the DPL community are free to revoke their patent licens-
es to the exiting party going forward.214 
Schultz and Urban argue that the DPL addresses many of the reasons 
why open innovation communities have traditionally failed to patent their 
technologies.  The DPL helps distribute the costs and benefits of patents 
evenly among a variety of actors, thus accommodating the decentralized na-
ture of open innovation;215 it addresses cultural and political concerns about 
patents in general by ensuring that patents are only used for defensive pur-
poses;216 and it employs a well-known tool to open innovation communi-
ties—a license—to ensure a reliable commitment to openness.217 
The most immediate weakness of the proposed solution is similar to 
one from which patent pools suffer: the solution is primarily a solution if 
those least likely to join nevertheless do.  And those most likely to join are 
those least likely to sue each other in any event.  While the DPL may add 
cement to strategic reasons for non-aggression, it seems unlikely to do 
much beyond that, at least in this regard. 
Indeed, non-commercial developers, foundations, and Open Innova-
tion Companies are more likely to join because they have little to lose and 
much to gain, since open innovation is their way of life.  But larger compa-
nies with significant portfolios seem less likely to join because the diversity 
and ever-changing nature of their business make it nearly impossible to en-
ter such a commitment; their rising competitors could join at any time, ob-
tain a license to the larger firm’s patent portfolio, and lose little in return.  
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And in many cases, the success of the DPL effort would seem to depend on 
these larger firms joining. 
Furthermore, while the DPL would distribute some benefits of patents 
among those acceding to the DPL—namely, a guarantee that the licensors 
will not sue other members of the DPL community—arguably some of the 
most important benefits of patents remain undistributed.  For instance, the 
DPL does not make patents available to fend off would-be patent aggres-
sors.  Patent pools may thus have an advantage over the DPL approach in 
this respect. 
Another potential issue with the proposal is that it neglects to system-
atically analyze the risks that open innovation communities face.  Instead, it 
appears to take the risk as a given and treats open innovation communities 
monolithically in terms of patent risks.  But as this Article has argued, pa-
tent risks differ significantly depending on the type of participant in the 
open innovation community.  Defining the risk is the first step in develop-
ing the right solution, and arguably the DPL proposal glosses over this is-
sue. 
Schultz and Urban are also hopeful that the DPL will help address 
risks associated with patent trolls.  While they acknowledge that patent 
trolls are a systemic issue that even their private ordering solution cannot 
completely solve, they suggest that the irrevocability of the patent licenses 
granted under the DPL may reduce the attractiveness of such patents to pa-
tent trolls in future patent sales.218 
This certainly may be the case if large numbers of patents became, 
eventually, part of the DPL network.  But as argued above, the chances of 
this happening seem slim, especially if joining may reduce the value of the 
firms’ patent portfolios and therefore make them more difficult to sell.  Fur-
thermore, such patents could still be used against anyone that had not joined 
the DPL community, as well as against those that joined the community af-
ter the patent troll acquired the patent and withdrew it from the DPL com-
munity.  Such temporal complexities suggest that the DPL may be less ef-
fective than hoped in addressing patent troll risks.  Indeed, though a 
systemic solution may be unlikely, it still remains the one best capable of 
addressing the risk. 
Lastly, while Schultz and Urban are hopeful that a growing DPL 
community would encourage participants in open innovation communities 
to more aggressively patent their technologies, this hope may falter because 
of the inherent difficulty with patenting open innovation, as discussed 
above.  In the end, open innovation may simply be unpatentable in some 
cases or certainly more difficult in others, precisely because of the decen-
tralized, incremental nature of inventive activity in open innovation com-
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munities.  Open innovation’s natural strength thereby becomes a weakness, 
but not an inborn one.  Reforming patent law could address the issue. 
IV.  REASSESSING PATENT LAW THEORY AND SOLUTIONS 
In Part I, this Article explored the predominant theories of patent law; 
how open innovation may challenge those theories; and how those theories, 
to the extent that they undergird current patent law, may undermine open 
innovation.  Having subsequently explored the actual patent risks that dif-
ferent participants in open innovation communities face, as well various pa-
tent-centric strategies to address them, this Article now briefly returns to 
patent law theory.  In so doing, it also takes up the task of exploring possi-
ble solutions to reconciling open innovation with the patent system based 
on what this Article suggests about patent law theory. 
A.  Patent Law Theory Redux 
It seems clear that patent law, even in its current form, does not threat-
en to extinguish open innovation.  But the lack of portending doom is less 
the result of protections in patent law itself and more the result of informal, 
exogenous factors. 
For instance, as discussed, non-commercial developers and founda-
tions face little if any actual patent risks.  Those that wish to invent and 
contribute technology without significant commercial motives are generally 
free to do so.  But, their free pass results, not because patent holders have 
no recourse against them under current patent law, but because, generally, 
such patent holders lack strategic reasons to come after them. 
Patent risk, unsurprisingly, rises with commercial activity.  But even 
Open Innovation Companies and commercial users of open innovation are 
managing to survive, and in some cases even thrive, in spite of patents and 
their purported negative effects on open innovation.  Some of this uneasy 
coexistence is also almost certainly the result of informal, exogenous fac-
tors; because of likely public backlash, patent holders may forebear assert-
ing patents against other commercial enterprises in the absence of signifi-
cant strategic reasons to do so.  Some of this result also likely stems from 
the fact that, in many cases, the overall benefits to users of open innovation 
still outweigh the negative effects associated with patents. 
While the survival of open innovation thus seems likely, what does its 
story say about patent law theory and patent law itself?  One thing seems 
clear: many engage in inventive activity in spite of patents, not because of 
them.  The open innovation story is one of diverse actors collaborating to-
gether to create significant amounts of freely available technology, all with-
out the ability to exclude others via patent rights as a necessary precondi-
tion to such activity.  The myth of the sole inventor—and its starring role in 
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helping shape modern patent law—remains a myth in the context of open 
innovation.  And the idea that such collaborators need strong patent rights 
before engaging in such activity is also a myth that has been disproved time 
and again by open innovation’s many instances of patentless innovation. 
Those that are forced to live by these myths are also often forced to 
waste resources seeking to protect their mode of innovation.  The signifi-
cant defensive patent efforts reviewed above—from patent pools to new ap-
proaches such as the DPL—are just a few examples of resource-intensive 
efforts aimed at combating perceived patent risks.  Others may include de-
velopers and companies spending significant amounts of time and resources 
designing around the reach of patents in technically unfavorable but patent-
ly required ways.  In an ideal world, such resources would instead be devot-
ed to innovating for the public good. 
But none of this is to say that patents do not have merit in many con-
texts.  Many do rely on the reward of a patent in order to engage in in-
ventive activity.219  While open innovators may pursue patents when avail-
able primarily in order to protect against patent aggressors, i.e., as a stick, 
the patent aggressor may not have engaged in inventive activity without the 
prospect of a patent carrot.  If patents did not exist, would the inventive ac-
tivity that the carrot seeker undertook have been made up for by open inno-
vation communities?  Answering that counterfactual is impossible.  And 
that is not the job of patent law in any event, which is to encourage in-
ventive and innovative activity, not dictate the direction or source of it. 
Furthermore, patent-motivated inventive activity may often play a role 
in spurring inventive activity within open innovation communities them-
selves, and vice-versa.  The two systems need not be mutually exclusive 
and in fact may complement each other in many cases.220 
Fixing the patent system, then, seems more a task of better enabling 
both models of innovation rather than choosing one over the other.  Some 
view the two models of innovation as mutually exclusive systems.  Many 
proposed solutions, consequently, have been rather simple: abolish patents 
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altogether.221  But that does not seem to be the lesson of open innovation.  
Companies engage in both open and closed innovation simultaneously all 
the time, in some cases with patent rights as the catalyst and in others not.  
In short, both models of innovation seem to have merit in encouraging in-
novation.  The next sections explore possible ways to improve the coexist-
ence of open innovation and the patent system and thereby “promote the 
Progress of Science and [the] useful Arts.”222 
B.  Prior User Rights 
One potential way to better accommodate both types of innovation is 
in the form of prior user rights.  Prior user rights are a defense to patent in-
fringement that allow a third party the limited right to continue to practice 
an invention for which it did not obtain a patent, despite another party ob-
taining a patent whose claims read on the invention.223 
Before the America Invents Act of 2011, prior user rights were limited 
to business method patents.224  Following the America Invents Act, prior 
user rights are now available for any category of invention, so long as the 
user “commercially used” the invention at least one year before the earlier 
of the other party’s patent application filing date and the first public disclo-
sure of the invention.225 
Several factors, however, make prior user rights—at least in their cur-
rent form—a weak solution to the open innovation conundrum.  Practically, 
prior user rights may be mostly available to inventions that qualify as trade 
secrets, since other public uses would typically qualify as prior art that 
would simply bar a patent application for lack of novelty.  But even in cases 
of eligibility, prior user rights cannot be licensed or otherwise transferred 
except in limited cases.226  The intellectual property licenses upon which 
open innovation communities rely would thus be ineffective in publicly 
sharing openly innovated technologies. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to envision how this defense might be ex-
panded to accommodate open innovation without changing it entirely.  
Some of the necessary accommodations—for instance, alienability—would 
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begin to morph this defense into some of the other possible solutions dis-
cussed below. 
C.  Defensive Publications 
Another approach is for open innovation communities to more proac-
tively and effectively publicly disclose their technologies.  Open innovation 
communities may often come up with patentable solutions before others pa-
tent them.  In such cases, the solutions should be unpatentable for lack of 
novelty if the published technologies include all claim elements of the pa-
tent application in a single prior art reference.227  Or, patents should not be 
available even in cases where not all patent claim elements are found in a 
single prior art reference if the innovations are nonetheless obvious in light 
of what the open innovation community has already made available to the 
public.228 
But open innovation communities often do a poor job of making their 
ideas available in a manner that patent examiners are likely to come across 
them or, even if they do, understand what they are looking at.229  For in-
stance, many open innovation communities publish their projects as raw 
technology without much in the way of explanation.230  In the free and open 
source software world, open innovation communities release the raw source 
code for their projects, but significant work is often still needed to imple-
ment that source code as part of a product.  Furthermore, without additional 
guidance, the source code may offer few clues in terms of what inventive 
concepts it covers.  While such materials could still be used to invalidate 
patents after they issue, significantly higher hurdles exist in invalidating pa-
tents once they have issued.231 
Because of these issues, several groups have formed that seek to help 
open innovation communities create more effective prior art by publishing 
defensive patent publications.232  The idea behind such efforts is to publi-
cize the projects of open innovation communities in a manner that is more 
accessible and informative to patent examiners, judges, and the like.  Other 
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related efforts have focused on helping the USPTO find these and other 
sources of prior art prior to patents issuing.233 
Schultz and Urban point to certain problems with these approaches.  
For instance, open innovation communities are not accustomed to organiz-
ing themselves and their technical information in such a manner, so the 
likelihood of widespread, effective defensive publications becoming the 
norm may be low.234  If this is a valid criticism, however, then it also ap-
plies to advocating that open innovation communities seek patents on open 
innovation, something else to which open innovation communities are often 
unaccustomed (and in some cases deliberately opposed to).  Indeed, it 
seems that collaborative communities that are ideologically opposed to pa-
tents may be more willing to pursue defensive publications than seeking 
costly patents. 
Schultz and Urban also point out that patenting open innovation is 
preferable both in terms of the potentially defensive effect of the patents 
and as prior art—an issued patent is the “gold standard” of prior art.235  
While it is true that patents constitute one form of effective prior art, even 
the best form, the inherent difficulties in patenting open innovation may 
make this approach somewhat unrealistic.  Furthermore, simply because pa-
tents are generally considered the gold standard does not preclude the pos-
sibility that defensive publications can become effective themselves, even 
potentially matching that gold standard.  Indeed, if the collaborative suc-
cesses of open innovation communities are any indication, there may be 
significant reasons for optimism in this regard.236 
Nonetheless, though a defensive publications strategy has some merit, 
it still primarily relies on taking advantage of cracks in a patent system de-
signed around the economic incentives story of patents.  Arguably, a better 
solution would acknowledge the merits of open innovation by more explic-
itly accommodating it under patent law. 
D.  Patent Fair Use 
Some have argued that patent law should borrow from copyright law 
by adopting a “fair use” defense to patent infringement.237  Under copyright 
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law, the fair use defense grants someone who is otherwise infringing anoth-
er’s copyright in a work a limited right to continue to use the work.  As with 
copyright law’s fair use defense, proponents of this solution suggest that a 
fair use defense in patent law could provide a malleable instrument with 
which to protect against some of the excesses of patent rights.238  A fair use 
defense in patent law could thus also potentially help protect open innova-
tion communities from the patent risks that they face. 
One clear drawback with such a solution, however, is that it may offer 
little help to Open Innovation Companies and commercial users of openly 
innovated technologies.  Under copyright law, for instance, commercial use 
of a copyrighted work that has the effect of substituting for the copyrighted 
work in the marketplace weighs against a finding of fair use,239 and pre-
sumably a patent fair use doctrine, if adopted, would work similarly.  Open 
Innovation Companies and commercial users of open innovation—i.e., 
those facing the most significant patent risks under the current system—
would thus be left vulnerable to patent infringement claims to the extent 
that they commercially exploited openly innovated technologies in ways 
that technically infringed the patent claims of others. 
Those in favor of patent fair use suggest a list of factors that, if taken 
into account consistently in favor of open innovation communities, may 
help avoid this result.240  But that discussion points to another likely weak-
ness of patent fair use in reconciling open innovation with the patent sys-
tem: the unpredictability of how courts may apply the doctrine, even if 
adopted.  Such unpredictability has been one of the most frequent criticisms 
of copyright’s fair use defense, for instance.241 
Thus, though a patent fair use doctrine may make some intuitive sense, 
it seems less capable of solving the conflict between the phenomenon of 
open innovation and the patent system and addressing some of the more 
significant risks that Open Innovation Companies and commercial users of 
open innovation face. 
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E.  Independent Invention Defense 
Unlike copyright law, where independent creation of a work is a de-
fense to copyright infringement, patent law provides no such defense—it is 
generally a strict liability regime.242  Patent rights typically may be exer-
cised against anyone practicing the patented invention, regardless of wheth-
er they copied the invention from the patentee.243 
Some studies suggest that the majority of inventions are simultaneous-
ly developed independently by any number of inventors.244  This phenome-
non may suggest that awarding absolute patent rights to any of those inven-
tors is unnecessary to incent the inventive activity; presumably at least one 
of those inventors would have undertaken the inventive activity without the 
lure of a patent, and perhaps, in fact, did.  Consequently, some scholars ar-
gue that an “independent invention” defense to patent infringement could be 
an equitable means by which to address issues relating to patent trolls as 
well as curbing unnecessary costs imposed on society via granting absolute 
patent rights.245 
Such a defense, furthermore, could be a means by which to reconcile 
open models of innovation with the current patent system.  Indeed, if open 
innovators could rely on such a defense both to develop their technologies 
and license them to others, then an independent invention defense may be a 
promising solution to the open innovation/patent conundrum. 
But an independent invention defense may make patents much less 
valuable and thereby undermine incentives to invent for those that do invent 
in pursuit of patent carrots.246  If potential participants in a patent race knew 
that winning the race only provided the winner with rights against those 
knowingly in the race, incentives to engage in the race may be significantly 
reduced.  Such weakened patent rights may also reduce the value of the pa-
tents as licensable assets.247  And if all possible participants in the race 
withdrew because of such factors, then society may lose out on significant 
amounts of inventive activity.  In short, while the phenomenon of simulta-
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neous, independent invention may suggest an independent invention de-
fense is a good idea, it may also suggest it is a bad one under a different set 
of assumptions. 
An independent invention defense may also lead to less inventive ac-
tivity because it might encourage parties to syphon themselves off from 
others.  That is, parties may be so fearful of being contaminated with 
knowledge of others’ technology that they may go to extreme lengths to 
avoid such contamination.  But there are good reasons to believe that in-
formation sharing leads to enhanced inventive activity, even outside an 
open model of innovation.248 
An independent invention defense could be especially devastating to 
the patent system when applied to open innovation.  For instance, for an in-
dependent invention defense to be effective for open innovation communi-
ties, it would have to allow independent inventors to freely license their in-
ventions to others, and those others must also have immunity from patent 
assertions.  In other words, the independent invention defense would need 
to be capable of running with the independently invented technology.  Oth-
erwise, an independent invention defense would serve open innovation 
communities only poorly. But if such were the case, in many cases the actu-
al patent holder would quickly have no rights against the world because the 
open innovation community’s independently invented technology would be 
freely available under the generally permissive open license terms. 
In sum, while the independent invention defense has much to offer, it 
may go too far.  In the first instance, there are significant, unanswered ques-
tions regarding what effect such a defense would have on incentives to en-
gage in inventive activity.  Furthermore, for it to help reconcile open inno-
vation with the patent system, an independent invention defense would have 
to run with the technology and be freely alienable, including by way of the 
pervasive permissive licensing typical to open innovation communities.  
But if that were true, the defense may swallow the general patent rule inso-
far as open innovation is concerned.  These realities may suggest additional 
reasons to fear that an independent invention defense would go too far in 
eroding inventive incentives. 
F.  A Two-Track System 
1.  The Mechanics 
Another possibility to addressing the incompatibilities between open 
innovation and the current patent system is an independent invention de-
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fense with a significant twist: making the defense conditional.  For instance, 
a reformed patent system could allow anyone to forego the right to offen-
sively assert patents against third parties.  In exchange, the party would re-
ceive patent infringement immunity for its use of otherwise infringing tech-
nologies so long as the technologies were independently invented.  In other 
words, the patent system could explicitly protect open innovators and others 
so long as (1) the allegedly infringing technology was independently in-
vented, and (2) the party gives up any right to assert patents against others 
except defensively. 
Before assessing the possible advantages and disadvantages of such a 
system, a few clarifying comments about its mechanics are in order.  First, 
if a party claiming the defense had actual notice of the patented technology 
before it conceived the same invention, then clearly its claim of “independ-
ent invention” would fail.249  In such cases, the party would thus not be eli-
gible for the defense.  Actual notice of the invention before the claiming 
party conceived the same invention would thus be a relatively straightfor-
ward rebuttal to a claim of independent invention. 
But constructive notice should also bar an independent invention 
claim.250  Otherwise, the previously mentioned problems with willful igno-
rance may arise, which could lead to less inventive activity as parties sy-
phon themselves off from each other.  But as Samson Vermont argues, con-
structive notice should be more than the standard for determining prior art 
under current patent law, where a single publication in some remote loca-
tion may constitute prior art that forecloses the possibility of a patent (and 
in this case, the independent invention defense).251  A stronger possibility of 
actually having obtained notice would be preferable. 
One possibility is to borrow from copyright law.  For instance, when 
determining whether a third party has violated a copyright holder’s exclu-
sive right to copy a work in cases where no direct proof of copying exists, 
courts analyze whether (1) the accused infringer had sufficient access to the 
copyrighted work, and (2) substantial similarity exists between the two 
works.252  A similar construct might be used in assessing whether some-
thing was independently invented in the patent space. 
As envisioned, then, determining whether technologies were inde-
pendently invented would be the prerogative of courts.  Independent inven-
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tion would thus be an affirmative defense to patent infringement rather than 
something determined by the USPTO or any other agency ex ante.253 
If the relevant technology was independently invented, then a party 
may use it without being liable for patent infringement if the party also 
agrees to forego its right to assert patents against others, except in defensive 
scenarios where third parties have already asserted patents against them.  
Such an agreement could be accomplished through a simple registration 
system, publicly available for others to review.254  Registration would also 
mean that any patents that the registering party acquires after registering 
would be designated “defensive-only” patents for the life of such patents.  
This would help address concerns about patents being transferred to unreg-
istered parties, such as patent trolls, who then might be used as the register-
ing party’s enforcer.  De-registering should also be possible, though the reg-
istration system and rules surrounding it would need to be carefully crafted 
in order to address significant gamesmanship issues.255 
Parties would also be able to share independently invented technolo-
gies with others.  That is, the defense would run with the technology for 
third parties that opted into the system and otherwise legitimately received 
the materials.256  On the other hand, parties that independently invented the 
technologies would be unable to claim the defense if they failed to register 
in the system, even if others opting into the system could. 
2.  The Advantages 
Such a system presents several advantages over other proposals.  First, 
unlike the DPL, patent pools, and patent pledges, the system would not de-
pend on parties joining or pledging patents that are unlikely to do so.  If a 
party opted into the system, it would receive patent infringement immunity 
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for its use of independently invented technologies from the parties most 
likely to assert patents against it.257 
For instance, such a system would help curtail the patent troll problem.  
Patent trolls and others could still assert and win suits against unregistered 
parties, even in cases of independently invented technologies.  And patent 
trolls and others could assert and win suits against registered parties for 
their use of technologies that were not independently invented.258  But the 
system would help address what may be one of the more sinister activities 
of patent trolls: patent suits for use of technologies developed independent-
ly and in good faith. 
Of course, patent troll problems would certainly not disappear.  Be-
cause courts would have to determine whether something was independent-
ly invented, trolls may still convince many parties to settle rather than un-
dergo the costly litigation that may or may not lead to a finding of 
independent invention.  But the prospect of a liberal independent invention 
defense may both embolden many defendants to contest the claims of trolls 
and others as well as deter initiation of some suits in the first place. 
Arguably such a system would also still provide significant incentives 
to invent and innovate, to both those opting into the system and those re-
maining outside of it.  For those opting in, the system would provide them 
with incentives to develop their technologies as quickly as possible in order 
to take advantage of the patent infringement immunity.  It may also encour-
age greater collaboration between registering parties in order to ensure that 
independently invented technologies are developed more quickly. 
Furthermore, the system would also encourage such parties to publicly 
disclose their inventions as quickly as possible, and in a publicly useful 
manner.  For instance, it would be far easier to demonstrate independent in-
vention of a technology by pointing to the release dates of a product or 
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well-known publication than relying on internal notes or email exchanges 
between engineers.  Thus, the two-track system would incorporate the ad-
vantages of defensive publications discussed above as well as benefiting 
society generally through such early disclosures. 
Parties opting into the system may also still have some incentives to 
obtain patents.  Consequently, if patents in today’s system provide such par-
ties with incentives to invent (e.g., because they need patents for defensive 
purposes), patents would play a similar role in the reformed system.  For 
instance, such parties may still face patent suits for their use of technology 
that was not independently invented, and so may still obtain patents for de-
fensive purposes.  And even in cases where they believe the technology was 
independently invented, they may want patents to help ward off patent suits 
from those outside of the system who believe otherwise. 
For those remaining outside of the system, incentives to invent (and as 
quickly as possible) also remain, but for the opposite reason.  For instance, 
if exclusive patent rights are a make-or-break event for such inventors, then 
they have all the more reason to invent as quickly as possible and put others 
on notice of the invention, because doing so will decrease the likelihood of 
others successfully claiming independent invention.  In short, such a system 
may provide greater incentives to innovate quickly, whether one finds pa-
tents desirable or anathema. 
3.  The Potential Drawbacks 
Some may find the risk of weakened patent rights in an independent 
defense regime significant enough that they forego innovative activity.  In-
deed, if the potential of weaker patents caused all or significant numbers of 
would-be inventors to sit on the sidelines in any given patent race, the pro-
posed system may be less defensible.  Put simply: it may do more harm 
than good. 
The conditional nature of the defense, however, makes such an out-
come unlikely because, arguably, patents would remain strongest where 
they matter most.  For instance, the likelihood of pharmaceutical companies 
opting into the system seems doubtful; their significant upfront costs asso-
ciated with research and development and FDA testing and approval may 
make the ability to exclude others through patents of paramount im-
portance.  The proposed system would thus help identify where patents are 
needed—the relevant industries would likely self-select: actors in those in-
dustries where patents matter would almost certainly stay outside of the sys-
tem because of the required sacrifice (i.e., giving up the right to exclude 
others from practicing their patented inventions). 
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In industries where parties value the defense of independent invention 
more than the exclusive rights of patents, such as the software industry,259 
self-selection would likely occur in the opposite direction.  That is, it is 
more likely that many parties in such industries would opt into the system.  
The conditional nature of the system and the resulting self-selection by in-
dustry would thus help guard against weakening patent rights in ways that 
harm society, regardless of whether any given industry embraces or rejects 
patents. 
Aside from industries self-selecting and thereby mitigating the poten-
tially perverse effects of the system, there are other reasons to doubt that 
such a system would harm innovation.  For instance, in less crowded tech-
nology fields, the risk of independent invention is less of a concern, and 
thus the risk of weakened patent rights is, too.  Put another way: to the ex-
tent that parties opted into the system and successfully independently in-
vented technologies, such a system may weaken patent rights for others.  
But arguably it would only weaken them in cases where the invention is 
likely from multiple parties anyway.  In cases of true “lone genius” in-
ventive activity, the risk of weakened patent rights is less because inde-
pendent inventors are, by definition, less likely.  Consequently, the incen-
tive to invent such technologies would remain strong.  And such areas are 
precisely where we should want patent rights to be the strongest in order to 
encourage inventive activity that otherwise may not occur. 
But this analysis may appear to rest on faulty assumptions relating to 
what information inventors actually have about each other.  For instance, 
even in areas of “lone genius” inventive activity, the lone genius may fore-
go the socially beneficial inventive activity for fear that others are inde-
pendently developing the same thing, even if, objectively, independent in-
vention by others is unlikely.  Or, some parties that consider themselves 
“lone geniuses” may devote significant resources to expensive inventive ac-
tivities and largely justify these activities on the belief that exclusive patent 
rights will help them recoup their costs.  But it may often be the case that 
such self-perceptions are inaccurate and that, in reality, these self-ascribed 
lone geniuses are only one of many parties simultaneously inventing the 
same thing. 
Indeed, in perhaps the worst-case scenario, such lack of perfect infor-
mation regarding independent invention may cause all parties that rely on 
patent rights as an incentive to invent to forego the efforts necessary to do 
so.  In cases where open innovation communities do not fill the resulting 
gap, society may lose.  Thus, where previously multiple possible inventors 
raced to invent in order to obtain the prized patent, the two-track system 
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may in some cases weaken patent rights sufficiently enough to cause all to 
exit. 
But even if perfect information is impossible, some information is 
available, and this available information likely mitigates many of these 
risks.  Indeed, though a party can never know with absolute certainty 
whether another party is working on the same idea, it can often know with 
some amount of precision.  Parties routinely engage in market research in 
order to mitigate the risks associated with spending significant amounts of 
time and energy on ideas that others are already pursuing or are likely to 
pursue.  In short, this risk already exists under the current patent system.  
Although a two-tiered system may enhance it, there are measures that com-
panies can and already do take in order to mitigate it.  The likelihood of 
some areas of technological development being completely abandoned due 
to weakened patent rights thus seems unlikely. 
Furthermore, this possibility seems even more remote in technology 
areas where patents are more important to inventive activity.  This is so be-
cause, as discussed above, if patents are significant in such development ar-
eas, the likelihood of companies and others opting into the system is less 
because presumably one needs patents in order to survive in these spaces.  
And parties would have an easy way to identify which other parties are 
even eligible for the defense through the publicly available registration sys-
tem, as described above. 
It still might be argued that someone who exited a patent race because 
of the two-tier system may have been a better innovator than the independ-
ent inventor.  And so if the party does not pursue a patent or the inventive 
activity due to the possibility of weakened patent rights, society may still 
lose because it then does not receive the superior innovations (even if it 
does receive the invention, albeit from a party with a poorer implementation 
record).  But if the prospective patent holder is actually a better innovator, 
then in most cases it should still pursue the innovative activity, even with 
weakened patent rights, because society will prefer its innovations over 
those of others.  In other words, incentives other than patents should help 
keep them in the game. 
Indeed, overall a two-track system may provide a good indicator of 
how valuable patents actually are in encouraging innovative activity.  If 
large numbers of companies and individuals opt into the system, such a 
trend may suggest that patents do not typically act as carrots, at least in 
some technology spaces.  Instead, parties may seek patents simply because 
they perceive that they must in order to survive.  As discussed throughout, 
for open innovation communities such a necessity is both undesirable and in 
some respects infeasible.  And even for others outside of the open innova-
tion world, such expenditures are often simply waste. 
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If significant numbers of parties stay outside the system due to con-
cerns with the system’s impact on patent assets, this result might be viewed 
as an indictment of the system.  But it shouldn’t.  Normatively, the pro-
posed system is not for or against patents; it is simply meant to suggest a 
promising way to provide those willing to contribute technology to society 
without the need of a patent, such as many within open innovation commu-
nities, improved opportunities to do so. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Many in open innovation communities have long believed that patents 
unduly threaten their mode of innovation.  This Article’s exploration of the 
patent risks that different participants in open innovation communities face 
suggests this concern is exaggerated in some cases.  For non-commercial 
developers and foundations, the direct patent risks are often negligible. 
Open Innovation Companies and commercial users of open innova-
tion, on the other hand, face significant patent risks.  Indeed, some of those 
risks appear to be unavoidable, since the decentralized, incremental nature 
of open innovation may make patenting the resulting technologies inherent-
ly more difficult than in other contexts. 
But even these risks are unlikely to doom open innovation.  Open in-
novation presents significant advantages that many will likely continue to 
harness, even in the face of the waste that the current patent system causes. 
But this latter point makes one thing clear: the current patent system 
does cause waste.  Is that waste simply unavoidable, a necessary tradeoff 
for a net positive amount of innovative activity that the patent system 
yields?  Open innovation’s successes suggest no; many are willing to invent 
and innovate without the lure of a patent.  And many outside of open inno-
vation communities seem to find the current patent system and its effects on 
innovative activity increasingly troubling. 
Attempts by those within open innovation communities to solve the 
riddle have produced a mixed bag.  Efforts to use patents against the patent 
system are a well-known strategy in open innovation communities; it is the 
basis, for instance, of “copyleft” and “share-alike” in the copyright sphere.  
Some have called for an enhanced version of this approach in the patent 
sphere. 
But, as this Article has argued, open innovation and the current patent 
system have certain incompatibilities that stem largely from a patent system 
built on outdated patent law theory.  These incompatibilities, furthermore, 
may make using patents to combat patent risks an unviable long-term solu-
tion for open innovation communities.  While using the patent system to de-
fend open innovation against the patent system has yielded some help, ar-
guably the ultimate solution does not lie in patents.  Instead, it lies in 
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reforming the patent system to expressly acknowledge and facilitate a mode 
of innovation that avoids the societal costs that patents are meant to impose. 
This Article has suggested as one possibility for improving open inno-
vation and the patent system’s coexistence a two-track system that would 
better protect open innovation while still allowing industries that rely on pa-
tents the ability to do so. 
Would such a system work?  More study is needed to explore how 
such a system may affect patents and incentives to invent as well as possi-
ble litigation issues relating to proving independent invention.  And the ac-
tual mechanics of the system need additional assessment in order to address 
significant issues of possible gamesmanship.  Undoubtedly, though, patents 
would enjoy less predominance in such a system.  This Article offers an ini-
tial argument that this decreased predominance would enhance innovative 
activity rather than dampen it.  And by so doing, the patent system would 
undergo a much-needed facelift that better reflects the many ways in which 
innovation actually happens today. 
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